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INTRODUCTION
At the close of the twentieth century, skeletons of the steel
industry littered the landscape of Western Pennsylvania.1 Steel
mills that used to shine as symbols of wealth and security
languished as stark reminders of the once-fruitful past.2 Drained
of their jobs, hundreds of thousands of long-time residents
experienced economic hardships while poorer residents moved
into the region to take advantage of declining property values,
further compounding poverty rates.3 The abandoned mills
became brownfield sites.4 Brownfield sites are deserted
properties that remain undeveloped because they are
contaminated or potentially contaminated by a hazardous
substance.5 Blighted and unused, these sites reinforced the
communities’ feelings of despair.6 Areas that had once thrived
experienced huge population and financial losses as both
residents and businesses fled the area, crime and drug use

1. See generally Nancy Perkins, A Tale of Two Brownfield Sites: Making the Best of Times
from the Worst of Times in Western Pennsylvania’s Steel Valley, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
503 (2007) (analyzing the redevelopment of two brownfield-ridden communities in
Western Pennsylvania from an environmental justice (“EJ”) perspective).
2. See id. at 504 (illustrating the boom of the lucrative steel industry in Western
Pennsylvania and its subsequent decline in the 1980s).
3. See id. at 507–08, 513–14 (describing the economic and social decline of the
communities of Homestead, Munhall, West Homestead, and Pittsburgh’s South Side
after the closure of the prosperous steel mills).
4. See id. at 504–05 (outlining the rise and fall of the steel mills and introducing
the concept of brownfield sites).
5. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(39)(A) (2006) [hereinafter Revitalization Act] (“The term ‘brownfield site’
means real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant,
or contaminant.”). Both the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act (“Revitalization Act”) and the statute that it amends, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675 (2006) (“CERCLA”), provide extensive definitions of the terminology
used throughout the legislation. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 [hereinafter CERCLA] (defining all
relevant language used in the statute); Revitalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A)–(D)
(defining all relevant language used in the statute). The Revitalization Act is an
amendment to CERCLA. For the purposes of this Note, citations to either statute refer
to the same section of the United States Code.
6. See Perkins, supra note 1, at 507 (detailing the broken homes, increased
suicides, and “widespread despair and loss of self-esteem” around the former steel
mills).

2011]

BROWNFIELDS AND THE POOR

203

increased, and unemployment persisted.7 Around one-fourth of
the residents lived below the poverty line.8
The link between idle brownfield sites and poverty exists
not only in Western Pennsylvania but across the United States.9
Impoverished and minority populations around brownfield sites
experience conditions like those around the steel mills—an
economy in decline, decaying infrastructure, lower property
values, detrimental health effects, and increased drug use and
crime rates.10 Remediation and redevelopment, in contrast,
breathe new life into these neighborhoods.11
Remediation and redevelopment together have a positive
impact on brownfield communities through job creation, the
elimination of health and safety hazards, the construction of
7. See id. at 507–08, 513–14 (enumerating the various economic and social ills felt
by communities around the former steel mills).
8. See id. at 508–09, 514 (noting the difficulties experienced by populations
around brownfield sites and citing US Census Bureau figures for the communities of
Homestead, Munhall, West Homestead, and Pittsburgh’s South Side).
9. See infra notes 71–100 and accompanying text (describing the correlation
between poverty, race, and brownfield sites). Unless otherwise indicated, for the
purposes of this Note the poverty line is an annual income of US$6225 for an
individual. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 21 (2011)
(presenting data on income and poverty in the United States in 2010 based on the 2011
Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement).
10. See infra notes 88–99 and accompanying text (explaining the causality and
consequences of living in close proximity to brownfield sites).
11. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (2006) (mandating that remediation must
meet a level of cleanup that “assures protection of human health and the
environment” and specifying that remedial actions shall be analyzed based on the site’s
contaminants); see also Joel B. Eisen, “Brownfields of Dreams”?: Challenges and Limits of
Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 908–09
(emphasizing the inability to predict cleanup at any given site because each site must
be analyzed individually and explaining CERCLA’s “lengthy and multistep”
remediation requirements); Superfund Cleanup Process, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/cleanup/index.htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2011)
(establishing the many steps that result in remediation); Superfund Redevelopment, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/recycle/index.html
(last updated Sept. 23, 2011) (showing that redevelopment focuses on returning sites
to safe and productive uses). See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 560-F-06-233,
CHARLOTTE MAINTAINS REDEVELOPMENT MOMENTUM 1–2 (2006) (showcasing
Charlotte, North Carolina’s continued efforts to redevelop brownfield sites, creating
much-needed jobs and economic revitalization in impoverished areas); U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA 500-F-00-254, WENT FIELD BRINGS NEW HOPE TO IMPOVERISHED
COMMUNITY 1–2 (2004) (heralding the transformation of a ten-acre brownfield site
into an expansive park as the catalyst for the redevelopment and growth of a crimeridden, economically-depressed community).

204 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:201
safe, affordable housing, and community beautification.12 One
way to achieve these goals is to incorporate environmental
justice (“EJ”) considerations into remediation and
redevelopment efforts, which requires “the fair treatment and
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color,
national origin, or income with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies."13 The preservation of EJ
considerations necessitates a focus on sustainable development,
which recognizes environmental, economic, and social factors in
decision-making.14 Remediation and redevelopment efforts
12. See, e.g., Emily Fisher, Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: Same
Planet, Different Worlds?, 26 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 201, 212–13 (2003)
(discussing the positive effects of remediation and redevelopment on a neighborhood
near Boston that had multiple brownfield sites); Jessica Higgins, Evaluating the Chicago
Brownfield Initiative: The Effects of City-Initiated Brownfield Redevelopment on Surrounding
Communities, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 240, 249–54 (2008) (describing the many
successes of remediation and redevelopment in Chicago).
13. Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
environmentaljustice (last updated Sept. 15, 2011) (defining environmental justice
(“EJ”)). Although this is one of the most comprehensive definitions of EJ, many
sources define EJ differently. Another source analyzes the environmental rights of the
global population, stating that environmental justice is the principle that all people
have the right to clean air, water, and land, and that those potentially affected by
environmental decisions should have a meaningful say in the decision-making process,
regardless of race, income, or ethnicity. See UNIV. CAL. HASTINGS C. L. PUB. L. RES.
INST. ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF LEGISLATION,
POLICIES AND CASES v (Steven Bonorris ed., 4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR ALL]. Yet another source considers Massachusetts’ EJ
Policy and defines EJ as the right of all people to live in and enjoy a clean and healthful
environment and to have “meaningful involvement” in the “equitable distribution of
environmental benefits.” JULIAN AGYEMAN, SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES AND THE
CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 26 (2005).
14. See Sustainable Redevelopment of Brownfields, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/sustain.htm (last updated Aug. 5, 2011) (explaining
the benefits to surrounding communities of green building and smart growth on
brownfield sites); see also Patricia E. Salkin, Land Use, in STUMBLING TOWARDS
SUSTAINABILITY 369, 369 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002) (explaining that sustainable
land development “requires consistent integration of social, environmental, and
economic considerations in decisionmaking to produce results that promote a sound,
coordinated, and harmonious built environment”); U.N. Secretary-General,
Development and International Economic Co-Operation: Rep. of the World Commission on
Environment and Development, 54, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987) (presenting one
of the most widely used definitions of sustainable development as “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs”). But cf. Fisher, supra note 12, at 201 (noting that criticisms of
sustainable development call it “aspirational at best, and as ‘the latest in a succession of
restrictive . . . politically correct expressions’ at worst”).
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should also include affected communities in the conversation
about revitalization, giving communities a stake in the cleanup
process and increasing the chances that their interests will be
adequately protected.15 Public participation, coupled with
sustainable development, can be an effective combination to
successfully remediate brownfield sites and revitalize the
community.16
The aforementioned issues have both domestic and
international salience. Sustainable development has become a
central tenet of international environmental policy.17 Agenda
21, a United Nations (“UN”) action plan focused on sustainable
development and administered by the UN Commission on
Sustainable Development, has advocated that any effective longterm anti-poverty strategy should employ sustainable
development.18 Many agree that sustainable development is
especially important for emerging, developing countries and
newly industrialized countries that are looking to grow with an
eye toward economic, social, and environmental concerns.19
In South America, Brazil is not only a newly industrialized
country but the leader in brownfield site management among its

15. See infra notes 136–59 and accompanying text (explicating the benefits of
increased community participation in the redevelopment process).
16. See Joel B. Eisen, Brownfield Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 187, 223 (1999) (positing that a commitment to sustainable development for
effective brownfield remediation is incomplete without a focus on public participation
in addition to sustainable development).
17. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development: Now More than Ever, in
STUMBLING TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY 45, 49 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002) (describing
both the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, which adopted Agenda 21, a blueprint for sustainable development,
and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South
Africa, which assessed the implementation of Agenda 21).
18. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 314, 1992, Agenda 21, ¶ 3.2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(Vol. I), Annex II (Jan. 1993) (emphasizing that an anti-poverty strategy is an essential
part of a successful sustainable development plan).
19. See Dernbach, supra note 17, at 56–57 (arguing that while all countries should
promote and practice sustainable development, developed countries in particular have
a special responsibility to do so); see also A. Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty versus
Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest
Management, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 37, 52 (1997) (noting that, in modern international law,
sustainable development is often used in efforts to bridge the North-South or rich-poor
environmental gap).
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neighbors.20 Although Brazil’s brownfield policy is advanced
compared to these countries, its laws are ineffective at both
remediating brownfield sites and protecting the surrounding
poor.21 As a newly industrialized country, an advanced emerging
market, the fifth-most populous country in the world, and the
only country in South America with any brownfield law or policy
to analyze, Brazil is ripe to consider the applicability of the US
brownfield framework to its efforts at remediation and poverty
alleviation.22
This Note argues that the United States’ brownfield legal
framework and policy developments have worked to
simultaneously address environmental concerns and ameliorate
poverty. It recognizes that despite the lack of an extensive
incorporation of EJ concerns, and despite the absence of any
incorporation of sustainable development requirements into its
legislative framework, US federal and state policies on these
issues have positively complemented the legal regime to achieve
reductions in poverty levels and in environmental
contamination. This Note then argues that this approach should
be adopted by Brazil to alleviate poverty and develop sustainably.
Part I presents an overview of US brownfield legislation, the
effect of brownfield sites on the poor, and how sustainable
development and community involvement can positively impact
the poor and the environment. Part II shows that current
brownfield regulation in Brazil is insufficient at both
remediation and at protecting the poor. Part III suggests that
Brazil should adopt an improved version of the United States’
legal framework for brownfield revitalization.

20. See FTSE Emerging Markets, FTSE, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE_
Emerging_Markets/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (listing Brazil as an advanced
emerging country); infra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (distinguishing Brazilian
brownfield cleanup efforts from those of its neighbors); infra notes 201–44 and
accompanying text (proposing changes to the current Brazilian legal landscape on
brownfield management).
21. See infra notes 165–200 (analyzing contaminated site management in Brazil
and the effects of current legislation—or lack thereof—on the poor).
22. See FTSE Emerging Markets, supra note 20 (listing Brazil as an advanced
CENSUS
BUREAU,
emerging
country);
International
Data
Base,
U.S.
http://www.census.gov/idb/ranks.html (follow “Top 10 Countries” for “2011”) (last
updated Dec. 20, 2010) (citing Brazil’s current population as 203,429,773).
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I. BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION EFFORTS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EFFECTS ON THE POOR
This Part describes brownfield cleanup efforts in the United
States and their impact on surrounding communities. Part I.A.
presents the legal and administrative framework for brownfield
revitalization in the United States. Part I.B. discusses the
connection between brownfield sites and poverty and how
cleanup can positively affect the poor. Part I.B.1. examines the
correlation between brownfield sites and poverty, why this
relationship exists, and how it disadvantages surrounding
communities. Parts I.B.2. and I.B.3. explain the benefits of
sustainable development and community involvement for both
impoverished communities and the environment, and show how
the United States’ legislative framework allows for positive policy
developments.
A. Brownfield Revitalization Framework in the United States
The United States’ brownfield revitalization framework is a
combination of federal and state legislation.23 The overarching
federal scheme is the general legislation that allows for federal
cleanups and provides considerable leeway for state and local
governments to implement their own cleanup statutes.24 Two
23. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2006) (outlining state response programs and
their intersection with federal law); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-16-301 to -310
(West 2011) (establishing Colorado’s voluntary cleanup program (“VCP”)); 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 6026.101–.505 (2011) (establishing Pennsylvania’s VCP); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.1-1230 to -1237 (West 2011) (establishing Virginia’s VCP); see also Eisen,
supra note 11, at 886 (pointing out that state and federal cleanup programs work
together to encourage brownfield redevelopment).
24. See Eisen, supra note 11, at 886 (noting that the rise of VCP statutes is
consistent with the trend of the US Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
delegating responsibility for environmental protection to the states); see also Veronica
Eady Famira, Recycling Brownfields, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES
AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 605, 607 (Michael B. Gerrard
& Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008) (stating that the EPA has almost never taken
action at sites already being cleaned under VCPs); Dave Ryan, Whitman Applauds Senate
Passage of Brownfields Legislation, EPA NEWSROOM (Dec. 20, 2001), http://epa.gov/
brownfields/news/announcg_01.htm (follow “EPA News Release” hyperlink)
(explaining that the Revitalization Act gives increased funding and flexibility to state
and local governments for cleanup of brownfield sites). But see Eisen, supra note 16, at
207–08 (arguing that the failure to require uniform state VCP procedures is
detrimental to a goal of sustainable development and instead serves the goal of
returning brownfield sites to the market).
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statutes primarily shape the federal brownfield scheme—the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and one of its amendments, the Small
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act
(“Revitalization Act”).25 The US Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), an administrative agency that regulates
environmental protection, is the primary organ of
enforcement.26 Although the federal scheme addresses some
aspects of EJ policy, some commentators argue that the lack of
comprehensive EJ requirements can lead to neglect of the poor
as stakeholders in revitalization.27
CERCLA liability is one main obstacle to redevelopment.28
CERCLA defines a “facility,” the area where liability may attach,
very broadly, so that many sites fall within CERCLA's purview.29
Liability may attach to past or present owners or operators of a
site. Alternatively, it may apply to anyone who transported or
arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous waste at a

25. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675; Revitalization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (granting the US federal government the authority to
manage removal and remediation actions); 40 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2011) (granting the EPA its
regulatory authority); see Laws and Regulations, Summary of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/cercla.html (last updated Aug. 11, 2011)
(describing the EPA’s role under CERCLA).
27. Compare ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST JUSTICE &
WITNESS MINISTRIES, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987–2007, at 6–8 (2007)
(proposing recommendations for Congress and the Executive branch to increase
institutional EJ incorporation), with U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PLAN EJ 2014 2–6
(2011) (recognizing that the EPA should increase its consideration of EJ goals in
policies and programs and identifying specific actions to further incorporate EJ to
protect minority and low-income populations).
28. See Eisen, supra note 11, at 899 (positing that CERCLA liability “is most widely
perceived as the most serious barrier to redevelopment, outweighing all benefits”); see
also Douglas A. Mcwilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: Economics
and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 725 (1994) (calling the
“magnitude and uncertainty” of CERCLA liability a significant obstacle to urban
industrial redevelopment).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (“The term ‘facility’ means (A) any building, structure,
installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly
owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise
come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or
any vessel.”).
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site.30 This far-reaching liability standard has the positive effect
of holding owners, operators, or transporters of hazardous waste
accountable, while producing the negative effect of
discouraging developers from buying brownfield sites for fear of
being held responsible for cleanup.31 To encourage purchase
and development, Congress included the Bona Fide Prospective
Purchaser (“BFPP”) program in the Revitalization Act.32 BFPP
status is available to all prospective purchasers of brownfield
sites who conduct an environmental site assessment that meets
the EPA’s “all appropriate inquiries” standard for determining
environmental conditions.33 Undertaking “all appropriate
inquiries” involves, inter alia, review of the site’s prior
environmental data, research on prior use, and interviews with
past owners of the site.34 Compliance with this standard, and
with certain other qualifications, may allow parties to avoid
CERCLA liability.35 This promotes development without the

30. Id. § 9607(a) (“Covered persons [are] (1) the owner and operator of a vessel
or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal,
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance . . . .”).
31. See James A. Kushner, Brownfield Redevelopment Strategies in the United States, 22
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 857, 867–68 (2006) (lamenting that CERCLA cleanup liability
discourages the redevelopment of brownfield sites because owners could become liable
for, inter alia, groundwater contamination or contamination of a landfill where the
waste from the site has been sent); see also Mcwilliams, supra note 28, at 725–26
(agreeing that prospective purchasers and developers shy away from brownfield
redevelopment out of fear of liability for site contamination).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (defining “bona fide prospective purchasers” (“BFPP”)
and outlining the program’s general provisions).
33. Id. § 9601(40)(B) (requiring all BFPPs to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that they “made all appropriate inquiries into the previous ownership and
uses of the facility in accordance with generally accepted good commercial and
customary standards and practices”).
34. 40 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2011) (outlining the “all appropriate inquiries” standard
promulgated by the EPA and required to prove BFPP status).
35. See Famira, supra note 24, at 609 (stating that the BFPP Program allows parties
to avoid CERCLA liability); see also Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 104th
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threat of potential liability, which often deters purchasers from
buying the property.36 The general fear of liability, however, still
tends to inhibit redevelopment.37
One way that CERCLA allows federal and state brownfield
programs to work concurrently is through the grant program.38
Under the Revitalization Act, the EPA can provide grants for
brownfield revitalization to states, tribes, local governments,
land clearance authorities, regional councils, redevelopment
agencies, and other quasi-governmental entities created by state
or local governments.39 To date, the EPA has granted more than
US$14 billion in brownfield site cleanup and redevelopment
funding.40 Although the grants are seemingly high, there is not
enough money to fully fund cleanup and redevelopment.41
Given the high number of brownfield sites, insufficient funding
is a common problem during cleanups.42
Cong. 607–08 (1995) (testimony of Patricia Randolph Williams, Rep., National Wildlife
Federation) (explaining the steps BFPPs must take to obtain CERCLA liability relief).
36. See Memorandum from Barry Breen, Dir. of the Office of Site Remediation
Enforcement on Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers and the New Amendments to
CERCLA, to the Superfund Senior Policy Managers (Region I-X) and Regional
Counsels (Regions I-X), U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 1 (May 31, 2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/bonf-ppcercla-mem.pdf (explaining that Congress intended the exemption of BFPPs from
certain CERCLA liability to encourage redevelopment).
37. See supra note 31 (explicating how potential cleanup liability is a huge hurdle
to redevelopment).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k) (detailing the tenets of the brownfields revitalization
funding program); id. § 9628 (stating when the EPA can award funding to the states).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k) (outlining entity eligibility and general provisions for
brownfield revitalization funding).
40. See Brownfields and Land Revitalization: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/basic_info.htm (last updated Oct. 4, 2011)
(describing the EPA’s brownfield program).
41. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-857T, SUPERFUND: EPA’S
COSTS TO REMEDIATE EXISTING AND FUTURE SITES WILL LIKELY EXCEED CURRENT
FUNDING LEVELS 6–8 (2010) (predicting that despite funding from additional sources,
the EPA’s estimated remediation costs for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 will exceed
available funds if funding levels remain constant); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-05-746R, HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAMS: INFORMATION ON
APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPENDITURES FOR SUPERFUND, BROWNFIELDS, AND RELATED
PROGRAMS 4–5 (2005) (showing that in 2005, funding was US$164 million, a US$6
million drop from 2004).
42. See Brownfields and Land Revitalization: Basic Information, supra note 40 (citing
the EPA’s estimate of existing US brownfield sites as over 450,000); supra note 41
(explaining the inadequacy of funding); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (mandating that
remediation must meet a level of cleanup that “assures protection of human health and

2011]

BROWNFIELDS AND THE POOR

211

When granting funds, the EPA is required to follow certain
criteria.43 The Revitalization Act lists the factors that must be
considered when reviewing grant applications.44 Three of the
factors embody EJ goals: (1) the extent to which a grant would
address the needs of a low-income community with an inability
to draw on other sources for remediation and redevelopment,
(2) the extent to which a grant would address the identification
and reduction of threats to sensitive populations, such as
minority or low-income communities, and (3) the extent to
which the cleanup plan involves the community in decisionmaking regarding the redevelopment and future use of the
site.45 Although these are only three of ten factors, Executive
Order 12,898 reinforces this requirement by mandating that all
federal agencies conduct health and environmental programs
without excluding participation in the program, denying
program benefits to the public, or discriminating against
populations based on race, color, or national origin.46 Executive
Order 12,898 does not require federal agencies to consider
discrimination based on income.47
State voluntary cleanup programs (“VCPs”) complement
federal brownfield legislation.48 The Revitalization Act
specifically provides funding for state response programs, which
incentivizes state cleanups.49 Generally, states have wide
discretion when designing brownfield cleanup laws.50 Most VCP
the environment” and specifying that remedial actions shall be analyzed based on the
site’s contaminants); Eisen, supra note 11, at 909 (emphasizing the inability to predict
cleanup at any given site because each site must be analyzed individually).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k)(5)(C) (enumerating the criteria that the EPA must follow
when deciding which states receive funding for brownfield cleanups).
44. Id. (listing the requirements that the EPA must follow when reviewing and
granting funds for brownfield revitalization).
45. Id. § 9604(k)(5)(C)(vi), (ix), (x).
46. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) (requiring all federal agencies to address EJ issues).
47. See id. (failing to recognize income as a potentially discriminatory
characteristic); see also infra notes 71–100 and accompanying text (explaining the
correlation between minority and low-income populations and brownfield sites).
48. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting the duality of US brownfield
law).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (delegating authority to the EPA to award grants to states or
Indian tribes that have their own brownfield response programs).
50. See supra note 24 (noting the leeway given to state and local cleanups by the
federal government).
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statutes, however, have similar characteristics.51 They are
voluntary, meaning developers are not required to enter into a
program, and development is usually streamlined to accelerate
the cleanup process.52 Most importantly, VCP statutes provide
incentives for developers to remediate and redevelop.53 First,
states limit developer liability for past contamination against
future enforcement.54 Secondly, they can offer financial
incentives.55 Commentators have recognized that monetary
incentives ignite EJ problems when state programs tie incentives
to site development only and do not consider the level of site
contamination or the specific characteristics of the surrounding
communities.56 For example, in 2003, New York began offering
tax credits for brownfield redevelopment.57 The tax credits,

51. See Eisen, supra note 11, at 920 (describing common features in state VCPs);
see also William T.D. Freeland, Note, Environmental Justice and the Brownfields
Revitalization Act of 2001: Brownfields of Dreams or a Nightmare in the Making, 8 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 183, 196–97 (2004) (providing an overview of VCPs).
52. See Eisen, supra note 11, at 920 (comparing state VCPs); see also Freeland, supra
note 51, at 196–97 (explaining certain characteristics of state VCPs in light of the
Revitalization Act).
53. See Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields at 20: A Critical Reevaluation, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 721, 729 (2007) (finding that remediation incentives are now “one part of the
increasing trend of localities offering incentives to attract real estate development” and
that “[t]he primary brownfields incentives, of course, are those offered by the [VCPs]
now available in all but one state that provide road maps for developers to approach
state environmental agencies or brownfields revitalization agencies (if they exist) and
deal directly with the states”); see also Eisen, supra note 11, at 915–18 (showing the
rapid rise of incentives for redevelopment in VCPs).
54. See Eisen, supra note 11, at 921 (presenting certain features of cleanups under
VCPs); see also Freeland, supra note 51, at 197–98 (describing and comparing different
VCP characteristics).
55. See ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 13, at xv (recognizing that
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and other states have programs that give financial incentives
to developers who redevelop brownfield sites in EJ communities); see also Eisen, supra
note 11, at 921 (noting state involvement in cleanups under VCPs).
56. See, e.g., Freeland, supra note 51, at 194 (stating that while funding attracts
developers, developer concerns usually focus on “the potential of a given site to recoup
the investment of the developer,” a potential usually perceived to be unavailable in
impoverished neighborhoods); Perkins, supra note 1, at 521 (explaining EJ concerns
arising from state-encouraged development, such as locking in residual contamination
and preventing the site from ever returning to residential use, and developing sites with
gentrification as a final goal).
57. See Negotiators Try to Resolve NY Brownfield Cleanup, TIMES-HERALD RECORD
(N.Y.), (June 23, 2008, 7:09 AM), http://www.recordonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20080623/NEWS/80623003 (describing the old brownfield program in
New York); see also New Brownfields Law Boosts Cleanup Credits, JOURNAL NEWS
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however, were based on the economic cost of the project, rather
than on the level of site cleanup or the overall benefit to the
community.58 There was no cap on the amount of tax credits
one project could receive.59 This resulted in a surge of hotel and
luxury developments on brownfield sites instead of
redevelopment that could have provided services like affordable
housing for impoverished neighborhoods.60 New York is now
responsible for a potential US$3 billion liability in tax credits.61
This demonstrates the difficulty faced by lawmakers when
attempting to encourage redevelopment without instituting
perverse incentives that ignore the communities that surround
brownfield sites and result in financial injury to the state.62
(Westchester, N.Y.), July 24, 2008, at B1 (explaining the failings of the old brownfield
program in New York).
58. See Negotiators Try to Resolve NY Brownfield Cleanup, supra note 57 (lamenting
certain failures of the old brownfield program in New York); see also New Brownfields
Law Boosts Cleanup Credits, supra note 57, at B1 (highlighting concerns over the old
brownfield program in New York).
59. See Negotiators Try to Resolve NY Brownfield Cleanup, supra note 57 (describing
the old brownfield program in New York); see also New Brownfields Law Boosts Cleanup
Credits, supra note 57, at B1 (explaining the failings of the old brownfield program in
New York).
60. See Negotiators Try to Resolve NY Brownfield Cleanup, supra note 57 (noting a
negative effect of tax incentives of the old brownfield program in New York and
reporting that one main concern was that “too many tax breaks were going to lucrative
hotel developments in Manhattan and Westchester rather than replacing crumbling
factories with affordable housing in upstate cities”); see also Editorial, Improve
Brownfields Law, Spitzer Administration Changes would Curb Waste, Help Upstate, BUFFALO
NEWS, Feb. 7, 2008, at A6 (praising revisions to the old brownfield program in New
York and emphasizing the need to encourage brownfield redevelopment both upstate,
where “fallow . . . land goes untended”, and downstate, where high-value development
projects continue near and in Manhattan).
61. See Negotiators Try to Resolve NY Brownfield Cleanup, supra note 57 (describing
one of the negative impacts of the design of the old brownfield program in New York);
see also Jodi Sokolowski, Brownfield Law Will Cap Tax Credits, BUSINESS FIRST (BUFFALO),
July 17, 2008, available at 2008 WL 13345117 (reporting revisions to the old brownfield
program in New York).
62. See J. Alex Tarquinio, New Law Turns Brown into Green for New York State, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2008, at C8 (differentiating the new brownfield program from the old
brownfield program in New York). The new brownfield legislation stipulates that
redevelopment tax credits will be linked directly to cleanup costs. Id. These
redevelopment tax credits are capped at US$35 million or three times the cost of the
cleanup, whichever is lower. Id. There are also smaller remediation credits that are also
tied to the cleanup. Id. Additionally, there will be a two percent increase in tax
incentives when development focuses on low-income communities. See New Brownfields
Law Boosts Cleanup Credits, supra note 57, at B1. A fifteen-person advisory board will
oversee New York’s brownfield program for the first time. See Tarquinio, supra.
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Incentives for redevelopment that neglect EJ concerns and
thus neglect the poor arise in state VCPs because there are no
explicit federal statutory requirements for states to consider EJ.63
States are often susceptible to industry influence, focusing on
the site’s return to the market and its economic potential
instead of preserving EJ goals.64 Such economic potential can
result in positive financial gains for the state.65 Recently,
however, the EPA began an initiative to support and produce
state incorporation of EJ goals.66 Additionally, CERCLA does
require all state brownfield legislation to include some form of
public participation requirement.67 CERCLA mandates that all
states publish and open for public comment the proposed and
final remediation plans.68 Some commentators believe that the
public comment periods satisfy EJ goals.69 Other commentators
63. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006) (excluding any mandate for state
incorporation of EJ considerations).
64. See Eisen, supra note 53, at 751 (noting that the brownfield redevelopment
process is “subject to capture by well-heeled, politically savvy developers and a resulting
distrust by local residents”); see also Eisen, supra note 11, at 1020–21 (describing
industry influence on state and local regulatory bodies).
65. See Freeland, supra note 51, at 195 (explaining that when VCPs consider
property values as determinants of the site’s viability after redevelopment, states have
an interest in approving the projects most likely to create the greatest tax benefit to its
municipalities).
66. See OFFICE OF ENVTL. JUST., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS FACT SHEET 1 (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/publications/factsheets/fact-sheet-ejsejca-grants-2009.pdf (explicating a new EPA initiative to support and produce state
activities that satisfy EJ goals).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (2006) (outlining public participation requirements that
must be satisfied when adopting any remediation plan); see also Jennifer Felten, Note,
Brownfield Redevelopment 1995–2005: An Environmental Justice Success Story?, 40 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 679, 685 (2006) (finding that, as of 2006, all state brownfield
programs have some form of public participation requirements, though participation
levels vary). See generally ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 13 (highlighting
the different forms of public participation requirements and general EJ provisions in
VCPs).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a)–(d) (enumerating the requirements for publishing any
proposed or final remediation plans and explaining any significant changes taken after
adopting the final remediation plan).
69. See, e.g., Felten, supra note 67, at 694 (claiming that states are addressing EJ
concerns absent any federal requirement to do so, specifically through the use of
public participation requirements, and that the data demonstrates that the federal
brownfield program is an EJ success); Richard J. Lazarus, “Environmental Racism! That’s
What It Is.,” 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 255, 269 n.74 (suggesting that Executive Order 12,898,
supra note 46, has had "a positive effect on the public's participatory rights in seeking to
influence environmental decisionmaking").
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posit that public comment periods are only bare minimum
public participation requirements, and that public comment
periods alone cannot help reinvigorate impoverished
communities around brownfield sites.70
The US brownfield regulatory scheme is multifaceted. It
assigns liability, incentivizes redevelopment, funds cleanup
efforts, and marries federal and state remediation programs.
This scheme highlights EJ considerations in various aspects.
Despite these considerations, the connection persists between
brownfield sites and poverty in the United States.
B. Brownfield Revitalization and Poverty Amelioration
This Part discusses the link between brownfield sites and
impoverished communities and analyzes ways in which both
brownfield sites and the surrounding populations can be
remediated and revitalized. Part B.1. presents studies and
empirical data that show the connection between brownfield
sites and the poor. Part B.1. also considers the reason for this
connection and describes the negative effects of brownfield sites
on low-income and minority populations. Part B.2. explains how
sustainable redevelopment can positively impact both the poor
and the environment. Part B.3. depicts how community
involvement in the remediation process can positively affect the
poor and contribute to a successful site cleanup.
1. Brownfield Sites and the Connection to Poverty
Low-income
and
minority
populations
are
disproportionately located around brownfield sites.71 The
70. See Famira, supra note 24, at 611 (highlighting the struggle of communities to
have their voice heard during the redevelopment process); see also Freeland, supra note
51, at 184 (positing that the current brownfield legislation does not adequately
consider EJ goals); Sara Pirk, Expanding Public Participation in Environmental Justice:
Methods, Legislation, Litigation and Beyond, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 207, 213–14, 240
(2002) (noting that: the public comment period is often used in environmental justice
cases, but is not necessarily the best option; and advocating for an enhancement of
community involvement).
71. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 3 (1983) (finding a correlation between four hazardous
waste sites and communities that were predominately black and most were living below
the poverty line); see also ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 13, at xiv–xv
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United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice
reached this conclusion in their 1987 report, Toxic Wastes and
Race in the United States.72 Their updated 2007 report concluded
that race is a significant and accurate predictor of hazardous
waste facility locations and that there are large racial disparities
in the distribution of these facilities.73 Racial minorities
comprise the majority of the population around hazardous waste
sites, and comprise more than two-thirds of the population in
neighborhoods with multiple, clustered facilities.74 Given the
correlation between race and poverty in the United States, these
conclusions corroborate the academic findings on brownfield
sites and the poor.75
This predominant trend is also confirmed by raw data
findings.76 Milwaukee, Wisconsin is one of the most
(finding that brownfield sites are often located “in poor communities of color,” that
race in the United States is statistically correlated with income, and that “people of
color bear a disproportionate burden of environmental pollution”); Famira, supra note
24, at 605 (explaining that brownfield sites are more heavily concentrated in
“environmental justice communities,” which are low-income or minority communities);
Barry E. Hill & Nicholas Targ, The Link Between Protecting Natural Resources and the Issue
of Environmental Justice, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 5 n.13 (2000) (explaining that the
“literature is rife with statistics documenting the disproportionate burdening of
communities where minority and low income populations live”).
72. See UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND
SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 23
(1987).
73. See BULLARD ET AL., supra note 27, at xi, 1 (concluding that, based on the 2000
US Census Bureau data, “significant racial and socioeconomic disparities persist in the
distribution of the nation’s commercial hazardous waste facilities”).
74. See id. at xi, xii (demonstrating its findings that both “race” and “place”
matter).
75. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 9, at 1–2, 17 (presenting data
on income and poverty in the United States in 2010 based on the 2011 Current
Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement). In 2010, there were 10.7
million blacks living in poverty in the United States, which is 27.4% of the total black
population. Id. There were 13.2 million Hispanics in poverty, which is 26.6% of the
total Hispanic population. Id. Non-Hispanic Whites had the lowest poverty rate of all
racial groups. Id.
76. One caveat to the subsequent data on poverty, minorities, and brownfield
sites: the poverty statistics for cities are based on 2010 data, while the poverty statistics
for communities around brownfield sites are based on numbers from the 2000 US
Census. The reason for this is that: (1) the tool available for compiling this data uses
the 2000 US Census data; and (2) given the fact that poverty has generally risen in the
past ten years, and almost none of these sites has been returned to full use, the
numbers are likely unchanged. Compare CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 9, at
14 (citing the official 2010 US poverty rate at 15.1%, noting that this is the highest
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impoverished cities in the United States: twenty-seven percent of
a population of 605,013 lives below the poverty line.77 Between
North Twentieth and North Old World Streets in Milwaukee,
there is a three-and-a-half square mile radius that contains five
brownfield sites.78 In this area, over fifty percent of the
population lives below the poverty line.79 The surrounding
neighborhoods are between fifty-four and seventy-five percent
minority populations within a half-mile radius around each
brownfield.80
poverty rate since 1993, and acknowledging that 2010 represents the first full calendar
year after the recession ended in June 2009), with JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 1 (2001) (citing the official 2000 US
poverty rate at 11.3%).
77. See 2009 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates: Milwaukee City, Wisconsin,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&context=adp&-qr_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_DP3&-ds_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_&tree_id=309&-redoLog=true&-_caller=geoselect&-geo_id=16000US5553000&-format=&_lang=en (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (providing social and economic statistics for
Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 2009); Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
(follow
the
“Annual
http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/SUB-EST2009.html
Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places over 100,000, Ranked by
July 1, 2009 Population: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009” hyperlink for the Excel
spreadsheet) (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (estimating the populations of US cities for
each year from 2000 to 2009).
78. See EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (enter “Milwaukee, WI”; then filter results by entering “Brownfields” under
“Sites Reporting to EPA”) (last updated Aug. 1, 2011) (showing the location of certain
brownfield sites in Milwaukee, Wisconsin).
79. See EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (enter “Milwaukee, WI”; then filter results by entering “Brownfields” under
“Sites Reporting to EPA”; then filter results again by entering “Below Poverty (%)”
under “Demographics”; then click “Filter by Value” and enter “> = 50”) (last updated
Aug. 1, 2011) (showing the demographics around certain brownfield sites in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin).
80. See EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”; then enter “1805 W. State St” in
“Milwaukee, WI”; click the “EJ View” button) (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing that
within a half-mile around the 1805 W. State St. brownfield the population is 54.1%
minority); EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”; then enter “502–04 West Cherry St” in
“Milwaukee, WI”; click the “EJ View” button) (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing that
within a half-mile around the 502-04 West Cherry Street brownfield the population is
69.7% minority); EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/
ejmap/entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”; then enter “Ambrosia Chocolate
Former” in “Milwaukee, WI”; click the “EJ View” button) (last updated Nov. 3, 2010)
(showing that within a half-mile around the Ambrosia Chocolate Former brownfield
the population is 54.8% minority); EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”; then
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These correlations are found not only in the country’s most
impoverished cities. Charlotte, North Carolina has a poverty rate
of 15.3% and a population of 704,422.81 Around one Charlotte
brownfield, almost seventy percent of the neighborhood is
impoverished.82 About half of the neighborhoods within a halfmile radius around the brownfield consist of minority
populations.83 In Seattle, Washington, the poverty rate is even
lower—10.6% of a population of 616,627.84 Despite the relatively
low poverty rate, there is still an extremely strong correlation
between income, race, and brownfield locations: in one stretch
near Seattle’s Kobe Terrace Park, there are six brownfield sites
in a two-block radius, over an area of two-and-a-half square
miles.85 The poverty rate in this region is over forty percent.86
enter “J. Anthony Subdivision” in “Milwaukee, WI”; click the “EJ View” button) (last
updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing that within a half-mile around the J. Anthony
Subdivision brownfield the population is 74.6% minority); EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”;
then enter “Mandel Co” on “1400-1402 North 4th Street” in “Milwaukee, WI”; click the
“EJ View” button) (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing that within a half-mile around
the Mandel Co. brownfield the population is 57.7% minority).
81. See 2009 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates: Charlotte City, North
Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?qr_
name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_DP3&geo_id=16000US3712000&ds_name=&_lang=en (last
visited Oct. 23, 2011) (providing social and economic statistics for Charlotte, North
Carolina in 2009); Population Estimates, supra note 77 (listing US population statistics).
82. See EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (enter “Charlotte, NC”; then filter results by entering “Brownfields” under
“Sites Reporting to EPA”; then filter results again by entering “Below Poverty (%)”
under “Demographics”; then click “Filter by Value” and enter “> 68”) (last updated
Aug. 1, 2011) (showing the demographics around certain brownfield sites in Charlotte,
North Carolina).
83. See EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”; then enter “Brown’s Solvent” in “Charlotte,
NC”; click the “EJ View” button) (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing that within a
half-mile around the Brown’s Solvent Company brownfield the population is 55.2%
minority).
84. See 2009 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates: Seattle City, Washington,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&context=adp&-qr_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_DP3&-ds_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_&tree_id=309&-redoLog=true&-_caller=geoselect&-geo_id=16000US5363000&parsed=true&-format=&-_lang=en (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (providing social and
economic statistics for Seattle, WA in 2009); Population Estimates, supra note 77 (listing
US population statistics).
85. See EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (enter “Seattle, WA”; then filter results by entering “Brownfields” under
“Sites Reporting to EPA”) (last updated Aug. 1, 2011) (showing the location of certain
brownfield sites in Seattle, Washington).
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The half-mile radius around these six brownfield sites is between
forty-five and sixty percent minority populations.87
An examination of the causal link between low-income and
minority communities and brownfield sites can become a
chicken-or-the-egg analysis.88 Some commentators argue that
polluting industries are disproportionately located in minority
and economically-depressed areas, taking the stance that
polluters move into low-income areas.89 These commentators
86. See EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (enter “Seattle, WA”; then filter results by entering “Brownfields” under
“Sites Reporting to EPA”; then filter results again by entering “Below Poverty (%)”
under “Demographics”; then click “Filter by Value” and enter “> = 40”) (last updated
Aug. 1, 2011) (showing the demographics around certain brownfield sites in Seattle,
Washington).
87. See EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”; then enter “12th and Jefferson” in “Seattle,
WA”; click the “EJ View” button) (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing that within a
half-mile around the 12th and Jefferson brownfield the population is 50.3% minority);
EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/entry.html (go
to “Search by EPA Facility”; then enter “Beatter/Turner/Miller” in “Seattle, WA”; click
the “EJ View” button) (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing that within a half-mile
around the Beatter/Turner/Miller brownfield the population is 60.6% minority); EJ
View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/entry.html (go to
“Search by EPA Facility”; then enter “Former Lloyd’s Rocket” in “Seattle, WA”; click
the “EJ View” button) (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing that within a half-mile
around the Former Lloyd’s Rocket Gas Station brownfield the population is 61.4%
minority); EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/
entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”; then enter “Former Nu Way” on “113–12th
Ave” in “Seattle, WA”; click the “EJ View” button) (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing
that within half of a mile around the Former Nu Way Cleaners brownfield the
population is 60.4% minority); EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”; then
enter “Hamm Creek” in “Seattle, WA”; click the “EJ View” button) (last updated Nov.
3, 2010) (showing that within a half-mile around the Hamm Creek brownfield the
population is 47.8% minority); EJ View, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/entry.html (go to “Search by EPA Facility”; then
enter “Ninth and Jefferson” in “Seattle, WA”; click the “EJ View” button) (last updated
Nov. 3, 2010) (showing that within a half-mile around the Ninth and Jefferson Street
Building brownfield the population is 44.9% minority).
88. See Garric E. Louis & Luna M. Magpili, Representing Inequities in the Distribution
of Socio-Economic Benefits and Environmental Risk, 79 ENVTL. MONITORING & ASSESSMENT
101, 104–05 (2002) (questioning whether regarding hazardous waste sites, the
“associations between polluting facilities, poverty and race have arisen due to the
preferential siting of facilities in poor minority areas, or due to the preferential settling
of poor minority populations in areas that have had their property values depressed by
the presence of pre-existing pollution sources”).
89. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the
Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9,
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allege that environmental racism is at work, thus implicating EJ
concerns.90 Other commentators posit that the poor move into
polluted areas either before site abandonment, to take
advantage of industry jobs, or after abandonment, to take
advantage of depressed property values.91 Regardless of
causation, these abandoned sites have negative effects on the
surrounding communities. Many site contaminants can
disproportionately impact vulnerable populations, such as
minorities, women, and children.92 These groups tend to be
more susceptible to the deleterious health effects of site

33–34 (1997) (analyzing the demographics of host communities around hazardous
waste facilities between 1970 and 1990 and finding that, although researchers found no
consistent evidence that low-income populations were intentionally targeted for facility
sitings, there was evidence that many facilities were located in areas that were
disproportionately Hispanic at the time of the siting decision); BULLARD ET AL., supra
note 27, at xii (arguing that for many industries, it is a “‘race to the bottom’” for cheap
land and labor).
90. See EDWARDO LAO RHODES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A NEW
PARADIGM 6 (2003) (describing environmental racism as when
persons of color, either by design or neglect, endure a disproportionate share
of the cost of economic development and growth, without enjoying a
corresponding share of either the economic and environmental benefits.
They have virtually no representation among the major nongovernmental
environmental organizations and below-average representation within
environmental agencies such as the [EPA]);
see also Lazarus, supra note 69, at 257 n.17, 260 (explaining the coining of the term
“environmental racism” by the Rev. Dr. Benjamin Chavis, former executive director of
the NAACP, when Chavis yelled, “This is environmental racism!” during his arrest at a
protest over the siting of a landfill in a predominantly black community, and describing
Chavis’s application of the term to mean that environmental laws are themselves racist
in their implementation and application).
91. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1388–90 (1994)
(explaining the market dynamics theory of facility distribution, which posits that after
siting a hazardous waste or otherwise undesirable facility in a neighborhood, property
values will decrease, those who can afford to move will leave the neighborhood, and
low-income and minority populations will move to or remain in the neighborhood);
Perkins, supra note 1, at 507 (referencing specifically the brownfield sites in Western
Pennsylvania, to which poverty-stricken populations migrated in hopes of taking
advantage of the plummeting property values around these sites).
92. See Samara F. Swanston, Race, Gender, Age, and Disproportionate Impact: What
Can We Do about the Failure to Protect the Most Vulnerable?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577,
591 (1994) (describing certain vulnerable populations and how their susceptibility to
“environmental insult” differs from the “average” person’s susceptibility); see also U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR
ALL COMMUNITIES 21 (1992) (identifying low-income and minority populations as two
groups disproportionately sensitive to the health effects of air pollution).
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contaminants because they are predisposed to certain diseases.93
For example, some toxins may aggravate osteoporosis, a disease
more common in women.94 Notably, many environmental toxins
aggravate biological predispositions in minority populations,
such as diabetes, chronic liver disease, cardiovascular disease,
and chronic respiratory disease.95
Apart from negative health effects, depressed property
values in the area around brownfield sites discourage the
construction of new businesses and withhold much-needed jobs
and services from the neighborhood.96 Failing infrastructure,
too weak to support development activities, also deters new
businesses.97 Cities are deprived of the potential revenues a
remediated site could generate, weakening the cities’ ability to
pay for services such as education.98 Additionally, abandoned
brownfield sites are unattractive and prime locations for crime
and illegal activities, contributing to an overall feeling of
neighborhood blight.99 These effects are not unique to the
United States but are felt by populations across the globe that
live in communities around brownfield sites.100
93. See Swanston, supra note 92, at 591–93 (highlighting the health concerns of
vulnerable populations, such as osteoporosis and breast cancer in women and diabetes,
chronic liver diseases, cardiovascular diseases, chronic respiratory diseases, and HIV in
minorities).
94. See id. at 591–95 (proffering examples of how certain toxins aggravate certain
conditions particular to or prevalent in vulnerable populations, such as ozone, lead,
and “fat-loving” chemicals like DDT).
95. See id. at 593 (explaining that minority populations are often at the highest
risk for toxic exposure because: (1) they are subject to greater occupational exposure
as a result of the fact that they are overrepresented in the most hazardous fields; (2)
they disproportionately live in urban areas in nonattainment under the Clean Air Act;
and (3) they have older housing units that likely contain lead-based paint).
96. See Higgins, supra note 12, at 244 (enumerating the list of ways in which
brownfield sites harm surrounding communities).
97. See Eisen, supra note 11, at 914 n.147 (noting that although some brownfield
sites have excellent existing infrastructure, others are located near decrepit
infrastructure, which deters potential developers from building on such sites).
98. See Higgins, supra note 12, at 244 (discussing the deleterious effects of
brownfield sites on states and their citizens).
99. See Eisen, supra note 11, at 913–14 (citing reasons why developers shy away
from brownfield redevelopment); see also Felten, supra note 67, at 682 (explaining the
negative effects of unremediated brownfield sites on surrounding communities);
Higgins, supra note 12, at 244 (showing the tangible and intangible costs of living near
brownfield sites).
100. See infra notes 188–200 and accompanying text (depicting the negative
effects of brownfield sites on impoverished populations in Brazil as an example).
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The connection between poverty and brownfield sites
across the United States results in adverse impacts on the
surrounding communities. These adverse impacts include
health effects as well as social and economic disadvantages, such
as increased crime rates and drug usage. Sustainable
development and community involvement have been proffered
as two methods that can positively influence impoverished
communities around brownfield sites and help revitalize urban
blight.
2. Sustainable Development and Positive Effects on the Poor
Many consider brownfield sites to be ideal for sustainable
development.101 From an EJ standpoint, sustainable
development provides social and economic benefits to the
surrounding impoverished communities by focusing on healthy
living.102 From a developer’s standpoint, sustainable
development creates greater site value by improving the lifetime
operating efficiency of the new structure.103 It also increases the
site’s brand value, since sustainability can be used as a marketing
tool.104
Although there is no legal mechanism requiring sustainable
development on brownfield sites, the EPA encourages this
redevelopment approach.105 Along with the EPA, the United
101. See generally WILLIAM SARNI, GREENING BROWNFIELDS: REMEDIATION
THROUGH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Joy Bramble Oehlkers et al. eds., 2010)
(championing the sustainable redevelopment of brownfield sites from a developer’s
perspective).
102. See Fisher, supra note 12, at 212–13 (citing the Dudley Street Neighborhood
Initiative in Roxbury, Massachusetts, as a success story of how sustainable development
can benefit urban communities and address EJ issues). See generally Alexandra Dapolito
Dunn, Siting Green Infrastructure: Legal and Policy Solutions to Alleviate Urban Poverty and
Promote Healthy Communities, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 41 (2010) (arguing that
sustainably developed urban green infrastructures can reduce poverty and yield both
healthier citizens and a healthier environment).
103. See SARNI, supra note 101, at 5 (providing reasons for developers to build on
brownfield sites). “Operating efficiency” is generally defined as the “[r]atio of the
actual output of a piece of equipment, department, or plant as compared to the
GRP.,
planned
or
standard
output.”
Glossary,
ROCKWOOD
http://www.rockwood.com.hk/main/Glossary.asp#O (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
104. See SARNI, supra note 101, at 5 (emphasizing the desirability of brownfield
sites for development).
105. See Sustainable Redevelopment of Brownfields, supra note 14 (encouraging smart
growth and sustainable redevelopment through its Green Buildings on Brownfields
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States’ National Brownfield Association has been pushing the
United States Green Building Council (“USGBC”) to increase
the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”)
point value for developing a brownfield site.106 The USGBC is a
nonprofit organization that promotes cost-efficient, energysaving buildings and uses the LEED rating system to encourage
and support green construction.107 LEED certification focuses
on sustainable site development, water savings, energy efficiency,
materials selection, and indoor environmental quality.108
Increasing the point value for redeveloping a brownfield will
encourage developers interested in achieving LEED certification
to build on blighted lands.109 The National Brownfield
Association is also working with the EPA to promote
sustainability pilot projects.110
Building affordable, LEED-certified sustainable housing is
one way to benefit poor neighborhoods surrounding brownfield
sites.111 The EPA has a Green Buildings on Brownfields

Initiative and recognizing that smart growth can provide tangible economic growth and
“can remove blight and environmental contamination, create a catalyst for
neighborhood revitalization, lessen development pressure at the urban edge, and use
existing infrastructure”).
106. See SARNI, supra note 101, at 15–16 (explaining that green building on
brownfield sites can create value).
107. See About USGBC, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/
DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=124 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (describing the United
States Green Building Council (“USGBC”) and its objectives).
108. See What LEED Is, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/
DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1988 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (explaining that the
USGBC uses the LEED certification system to help building owners and operators
identify and implement “practical and measurable green building design, construction,
operations and maintenance solutions” and to encourage “projects that implement
strategies for better environmental health performance”).
109. See SARNI, supra note 101, at 15–16 (explaining the value of green building
on brownfield sites).
110. See id. at 17 (noting efforts of the EPA and the National Brownfield
Association to promote the greening of brownfield sites).
111. See Neighborhood Development Resources: Affordable Green Neighborhoods Grant
Program, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?
CMSPageID=2184 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (presenting the USGBC’s LEED for
Neighborhood Development grant program and explaining how LEED projects can
spur benefits such as green homes and infrastructure, walkable streets and green
spaces, new jobs, and access to healthy food); see, e.g., TASSAFARONGA APARTMENTS,
OAKLAND, CA: EPA REGION 9 BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM SUCCESS STORIES, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY 2 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/brownfields/landrevitalize/pdf/R9_FS_Tassaforanga_final_040111.pdf (depicting the joint federal-state
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Initiative, which provides communities with technical assistance
to facilitate green buildings on brownfield sites through pilot
projects.112 Additionally, there are many community-based green
building programs that incorporate the goals of both sustainable
redevelopment and public participation.113 For example, the
Community Economic Development Unit of Brooklyn Legal
Services Corporation A has been working to assist nonprofit
community development corporations to build and maintain
affordable green housing and other infrastructure such as
health centers.114 These lawyers are assisting community
development organizations in navigating the nuances of the
brownfield laws to provide low-income, primarily minority
neighborhoods in Brooklyn, New York, with healthy, residential
housing.115
Sustainable development does not always mean the
construction of LEED-certified buildings. For example, in
Michigan, brownfield sites are being redeveloped to provide
wind energy.116 Wind farms on brownfield sites are desirable
because, inter alia, brownfield sites are typically close to areas of
high energy consumption; incentive programs can be readily
applied to renewable energy programs; and there is the positive
redevelopment of an abandoned site for sustainable energy
use.117 In Michigan, there are 2946 brownfield sites capable of
cleanup of two brownfield sites in California that resulted in LEED-certified housing
for very low- to moderate-income residents).
112. See Sustainable Redevelopment of Brownfields, supra note 14 (offering
information about the EPA’s Green Buildings on Brownfields Initiatives).
113. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 102, at 50 (describing the community-based New
York Restoration Project, which “funds green improvements and upkeep in
economically and environmentally burdened areas of New York”).
114. See Jessica Rose et al., Community Economic Development Lawyers Assist Nonprofit
Organizations in Creating Holistic Green Communities, 44 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 257, 258
(2010) (heralding a green community economic development approach to
remediating systemic urban issues).
115. See id. at 259–60 (recognizing initiatives to address issues of employment,
available commercial space, and healthy, affordable housing shortages through
brownfield redevelopment).
116. See generally SOJI ADELAJA ET AL., POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY ON BROWNFIELD SITES: A CASE STUDY OF MICHIGAN (2009) (describing the
advantages and positive practical results of developing wind and solar facilities on
brownfield sites in Michigan).
117. See id. at 3 (identifying efforts to use brownfield sites to produce renewable
energy); see also GAIL MOSEY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, EPA/600/R-08/023, CONVERTING LIMBO LANDS TO ENERGY-GENERATING

2011]

BROWNFIELDS AND THE POOR

225

producing 4320 megawatts of energy from wind power.118 The
construction of wind farms on these sites would translate into
the creation of 2162 construction jobs and 196 long-term jobs.119
The EPA urges renewable energy generation on brownfield sites
and, along with other federal agencies, provides incentives for
renewable redevelopments on contaminated lands.120
Job creation that stems from the clean energy industry is
part of the new “green-collar” job movement, which many
propose as one approach to combat poverty.121 Green-collar
jobs, described as well-paid jobs that contribute directly to
building a sustainable economy, are usually local and provide a
long-term career path.122 The Cypress Hills Verde Initiative in
eastern Brooklyn, an organization focused on complete
community revitalization, has created a green-collar worker
STATIONS: RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES ON UNDERUSED, FORMERLY
CONTAMINATED SITES 3 (2007) (justifying the use of renewable energy technologies on
brownfield sites and other “limbo lands”).
118. See ADELAJA ET AL., supra note 116, at 11 (reporting wind energy potential for
each region of Michigan).
119. See id. at 12 (illustrating the economic development implications from wind
energy).
120. See FEDERAL INCENTIVES FOR ACHIEVING CLEAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON
CONTAMINATED LANDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 1–2 (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oswercpa/incentives/federal_incentives.pdf (outlining federal
incentives for installing clean energy as part of brownfield redevelopment projects,
such as federal tax credits for renewable energy investment and development).
121. See APOLLO ALLIANCE ET AL., GREEN-COLLAR JOBS IN AMERICA’S CITIES:
BUILDING PATHWAYS OUT OF POVERTY AND CAREERS IN THE CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 2
(2008) (championing green jobs as “the kind of family-supporting jobs that once
anchored the American middle class, but in the industries of the future: industries like
wind turbine manufacturing, solar panel installation, energy efficiency retrofits, and
green building”); see also Dunn, supra note 102, at 50–51, 60–61 (noting that the
construction and implementation of green infrastructure yields corresponding greencollar jobs in, inter alia, construction, maintenance, and installation, and detailing the
positive developments that result from linking construction permits to green
infrastructure); Environmental Workforce Development and Job Training, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/job.htm#bro (last updated July 11, 2011)
(describing a federal grant program that provides funds to organizations “to recruit,
train, and place predominantly low-income and minority, unemployed and underemployed residents from solid and hazardous-waste-impacted communities. These
grants help to create green jobs that reduce environmental contamination and build
more sustainable futures for communities”).
122. See APOLLO ALLIANCE ET AL., supra note 121, at 3 (defining and describing
green-collar jobs); see also Dunn, supra note 102, at 50–51 (citing statistics that show a
thirty-one percent increase in green-collar job hires from July 2007 to January 2009 and
predicting the creation of 6.9 million green jobs by 2020).
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training center to complement plans to construct new green
buildings and retrofit existing structures.123 Providing jobs and
requisite training through sustainable development involves
impoverished neighborhoods in the community revitalization
process and creates career paths that stimulate long-term
personal and widespread economic growth.124
It is important to note that the use of renewable energy for
site remediation may depend on the specific community.125 For
example, a community might benefit more from affordable
housing units than wind turbine facilities.126 Alternatively,
renewable energy structures might be ideal on a site that is too
highly contaminated for a housing development or an urban
garden.127 Although the clean energy industry widens the greencollar job market, which, in turn, positively impacts low-income
and minority populations, clean energy alternatives also
123. See Rose et al., supra note 114, at 260 (describing how training in the green
jobs industry accompanies efforts in Brooklyn to redevelop brownfield sites into green
commercial and residential properties).
124. See APOLLO ALLIANCE ET AL., supra note 121, at 3 (demonstrating how greencollar jobs not only spur economic growth but provide the opportunity for career
growth); see also Rose et al., supra note 114, at 260 (explaining a redevelopment
program that focuses on total revitalization of the neighborhood, including a greencollar jobs training center that will provide residents with the skills to conduct low-cost
energy retrofits to homes and will involve them in the redevelopment process).
125. See NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NREL/PO-64040844, RENEWABLE ENERGY POTENTIAL FOR BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
1 (2006) (noting that in the process of identifying suitable renewable energy
technologies for a brownfield site, economic, social, and environmental effects on the
community should be taken into consideration).
126. Cf. Evan Lehmann & Christa Marshall, Cape Wind Proposal Faces a Renewed
Political Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/pages/business/
index.html (enter “Cape Wind” into the search box; select the third hyperlink)
(detailing the opposition to the Cape Wind project in Massachusetts, a sentiment
sometimes expressed by communities near wind turbines). But see C.J. Hughes, A
Cleaner Way to Keep the City Running, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, at RE8 (reporting on the
small wind turbines that are powering some buildings in New York City and look much
more like small fans than large-scale wind turbines).
127. See Bill Scanlon, Brownfields’ Bright Spot: Solar and Wind Energy,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (June 16, 2010), http://www.renewableenergy
world.com/rea/news/article/2010/06/brownfields-bright-spot-solar-and-wind-energy
(commenting that although many brownfield sites might be too toxic to build on or
difficult to find redevelopers, renewable energy sources can be installed without
significantly disturbing the contaminated soil); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPOWERING AMERICA’S LAND INITIATIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN 3 (2009) (illustrating the
EPA’s progress plan for their initiative focusing on building renewable energy facilities
on formerly or currently contaminated lands, such as petroleum-contaminated lands).
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emphasize the need for redevelopment plans that are tailored to
the affected community.128
Urban agriculture is a movement that can contribute to the
sustainable redevelopment of brownfield sites while benefitting
low-income communities.129 Urban agriculture is small-scale
agriculture in an urban setting.130 Besides providing low-cost,
easily accessible, and healthy food, urban agriculture can
beautify the community, create jobs and educational
opportunities, and eliminate crime-prone vacant lots.131 Urban
agriculture can also help to bind soil contaminants, as some
crops thrive on contaminated soil.132 These green spaces
positively impact the environment by raising awareness of
environmental goals and aiding in carbon sequestration, the
process by which plants remove and store carbon dioxide.133
Urban gardens also enrich the soil with nitrogen fixation, are
128. See Scanlon, supra note 127 (showing that if a brownfield contains soil too
toxic to safely build housing or commercial structures, the land can be reused by
installing renewable energy infrastructure); see also supra note 116–23 and
accompanying text (discussing ways in which renewable energy installations create
green-collar jobs).
129. See infra notes 130–33 (detailing how urban agriculture can benefit lowincome communities while redeveloping brownfield sites).
130. See William Kraus, Urban Agriculture Takes Root, 44 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 277,
277 (2010) (defining urban agriculture as “localized small-scale agriculture within an
urban setting”); see also Jac Smit & Joe Nasr, Urban Agriculture for Sustainable Cities: Using
Wastes and Idle Land and Water Bodies as Resources, 4 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 141, 141
(1992) (defining urban agriculture as “food and fuel grown within the daily rhythm of
the city or town”).
131. See Dunn, supra note 102, at 52–53 (emphasizing that the incorporation of
green spaces in urban areas is an important environmental health and cost-saving
mechanism for the poor); see also Kraus, supra note 130 at 277 (recognizing the
potential benefits from urban farming).
132. See Urban Agriculture & Improving Local, Sustainable Food Systems, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/urbanag/index.html (last updated
Oct. 20, 2011) (providing information on agriculture projects as part of brownfield
redevelopment); Hannah Shayler et al., Soil Contaminants and Best Practices for Healthy
Gardens, CORNELL WASTE MGMT. INST. 1, 3 (Oct. 20, 2009), http://cwmi.css.
cornell.edu/Soil_Contaminants.pdf (explaining how to grow crops in contaminated
soil and listing which crops thrive on contaminants).
133. See Dunn, supra note 102, at 47–48 (discussing how green urban spaces offer
many benefits, such as better air quality through the increased uptake in carbon, an
increased quality of life, higher property values, lower crime rates, and enhanced street
life and community aesthetics); see also Kraus, supra note 130, at 280 (explaining how
urban agriculture not only promotes general awareness about the environment but aids
in carbon sequestration, “the process by which plants remove and store carbon dioxide
through photosynthesis”).
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good sites for composting, and create a tree canopy to reduce
stormwater runoff entering the sewer system.134
3. Community Involvement and Positive Effects on the Poor
An essential tenet of an effective remediation process is the
involvement of the affected community.135 Apart from being a
central concern when striving to achieve EJ goals, communities
are often best situated to assess the proposed remediation
plan.136 For example, the community, once informed about the
status of the site and the types of contaminants present, can
decide whether the brownfield should become a school or
whether the site is too highly contaminated and would adversely
impact children.137 Communities can also address threats such as
ineffective cleanup and the possibility that the proposed plan
will lead to “gentrification and the future inability to afford to
live in their own neighborhood.”138
Executive Order 12,898 includes a public participation
section that requires the EPA to ensure that all public notices,
documents, and hearings on environmental issues are concise,

134. See Dunn, supra note 102, at 52–53 (examining how urban agriculture is an
important environmental strategy and instrument for combating poverty, enhancing
food security, promoting local economic development, and providing nutritious
foods); see also Kraus, supra note 130, at 280 (describing multiple environmental
benefits from urban gardens).
135. See Felten, supra note 67, at 683 (arguing that “[b]ecause cleanup of these
sites has a major effect on the health and economic well-being of the surrounding
community, the community’s participation in decisionmaking is vital” and, therefore,
community involvement in decision making better serves the goal of sustainable
redevelopment); see also Perkins, supra note 1, at 528 (emphasizing repeatedly that
remediation needs to include the public from the beginning of the redevelopment
process).
136. See Felten, supra note 67, at 683 (explaining why brownfield redevelopment
requires community participation); see also Pirk, supra note 70, at 212–13 (championing
community participation because affected communities have unique perspectives on
their own values and can often offer a broader view than experts).
137. See Felten, supra note 67, at 683 (presenting various reasons why
communities around brownfield sites should participate in redevelopment decisions).
138. See Famira, supra note 24, at 610 (explaining why brownfield redevelopments
are often warily considered by surrounding communities). Gentrification is the
“restoration and upgrading of a deteriorated or aging urban neighborhood by middleclass or affluent persons, resulting in increased property values and often in
displacement of lower-income residents.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 755 (9th ed. 2009).
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understandable, and readily accessible.139 It also includes a
provision for translating crucial documents into other languages
for limited-English-speaking populations.140 This is an important
federal mandate on EJ concerns and recognizes both the
importance of public participation and the particular
characteristics of EJ populations.141 Many feel that the absence
of these requirements in state brownfield legislation, however,
enables
less-than-adequate
state
public
participation
requirements.142
Today, all states have some form of public participation
requirement included in their brownfield legislation.143 Most,
however, do not fully involve the community in planning;
instead, the majority of programs are public notice
requirements.144 Under these requirements, the public is
notified when a developer submits an application pursuant to
the states’ brownfield program.145 The public then generally
receives an opportunity to comment on the remediation
plans.146 By this time, however, developers, municipalities, and
bureaucrats have invested significant time and resources in the

139. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) (requiring all federal agencies to consider EJ issues).
140. See id. (specifying that “[e]ach federal agency may, whenever practicable and
appropriate, translate crucial public documents, notices, and hearings relat[ed] to
human health or the environment for limited English speaking populations”).
141. See id. (promoting understandable, accessible public notifications specifically
to increase agency consideration of EJ goals).
142. See Felten, supra note 67, at 685–86 (describing the public participation
requirements in state VCPs and showing that most states only have bare minimum
public participation requirements in the form of public comment periods); see, e.g.,
Freeland, supra note 51, at 198–99 (comparing VCPs in Texas and in Maryland and
showing that they generally only provide for public comment periods, if they provide
for any public participation at all).
143. See Felten, supra note 67, at 685 (analyzing the public participation
requirements in state VCPs and noting that although every state VCP contains some
form of public participation provision, the level of public participation in each state
VCP greatly varies).
144. See id. (finding that most public participation requirements only consist of
public notice requirements, which are informative, but do not fully involve the
community in decision making and therefore do not fully satisfy EJ goals).
145. See Famira, supra note 24, at 611 (elucidating the general public participation
requirements under most state VCPs).
146. See id. (describing public participation requirements under most state VCPs
while lamenting the ongoing EJ struggle for communities to have their voices heard).
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project and are unlikely to make alterations.147 Some states do
mandate a heightened level of participation: thirty-five states
require hearings for citizens’ voices to be heard, and four states
have citizen grant programs.148 Citizen grant programs, like New
York’s Brownfields Opportunity Areas Program, can provide
reimbursement of project costs to municipalities and
community organizations to develop revitalization plans and
implementation strategies.149 Communities can use these funds
to gain an understanding of land use and zoning, to evaluate
potential for revitalization, and to generally learn more about
the process of remediation and redevelopment so as to fully
inform and immerse themselves in the cleanup process.150
Without proper consideration, rising prices that accompany
gentrification may ensure that the impacted community is not
living with the effects of the cleanup process at all.151 Some
commentators argue that community involvement is one of the
best ways to prevent the poor from losing their homes and any
possible economic benefit stemming from the redeveloped
site.152 The importance of community involvement is evident in
147. See Felten, supra note 67, at 685 (criticizing public comment periods because
they give communities little time to mobilize and propose an improvement or oppose
part of the redevelopment plan).
148. See id. at 686 (praising citizen grant programs but decrying their scarcity).
149. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-r (McKinney 2011) (outlining the New
York state assistance program to community-based organizations or community boards
and specifying that the grant program can provide up to ninety percent of remediation
costs).
150. See id. (describing how financial assistance can positively affect the
community and redevelopment projects).
151. See Perkins, supra note 1, at 511–12, 526 (lamenting that although one
revitalized community in Pennsylvania experienced doubling tax revenues and new
upscale businesses attracted out-of-town shoppers, pre-existing residents remained
unemployed or garnered wages insufficient to support a family and thus might have
had to relocate); Andrew O. Guglielmi, Recreating the Western City in a Post-Industrialized
World: European Brownfield Policy and an American Comparison, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1273,
1308–09 (2005) (discussing brownfield redevelopment in Portland, Oregon and noting
that because Portland’s redevelopment strategies focused on regenerating tourism and
culture around brownfield sites, property values soared, efforts at constructing lowincome housing were ignored, and poorer populations were forced to move away from
the redeveloped sites); see also ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 13, at xv
(explaining that gentrification continues to threaten EJ communities around
brownfield sites).
152. See Famira, supra note 24, at 610–11 (proposing that communities can rebut
the threat of gentrification by obtaining meaningful involvement at an early stage in
the decision-making process). Some states have made an effort at requiring EJ
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Western Pennsylvania, where a comparison of Homestead and
South Side, two remediated sites surrounded by impoverished
populations, showed positive redevelopment and increased
sustainability around the site that was influenced by greater
community participation.153 The marked difference between the
two was the involvement of the South Side Local Development
Company,
a
neighborhood
community
development
corporation.154 While Homestead experienced an influx of
upscale businesses, drawing in wealthier shoppers from the
surrounding neighborhoods and depriving low-income workers
of sufficient economic development to regain control over their
lives, South Side preserved the historical features of the
neighborhood, such as the old street names.155 The high-density
grid pattern of the neighborhood remained intact (important
for ensuring sustainability), 150 new businesses moved into the
community, and affordable housing units were constructed.156
The project created at least 2500 jobs.157
The involvement of the South Side Local Development
Company empowered the community by securing its voice at the
table.158 The community could ensure the preservation of their
goals, such as maintaining the neighborhood’s identity and its
considerations in the redevelopment process through administrative policy. See, e.g.,
EXEC. OFFICE OF ENVTL. AFFAIRS, COMMW. OF MASS., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE POLICY 4
(2002), available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/eea/ej/ej_policy_english.pdf
(declaring that EJ “shall be an integral consideration . . . in the implementation of all
[Executive Office of Environmental Affairs] programs” and that the Commonwealth
shall design services to, inter alia, “enhance public participation” and “encourage
economic growth through the cleanup and redevelopment of brownfield sites”); Smart
Growth/Smart Energy Toolkit, COMMW. OF MASS., http://www.mass.gov/envir/smart_
growth_toolkit/pages/mod-ej.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (presenting
Massachusetts’ suggestions for municipalities and developers to better engage EJ
communities in the planning and development process).
153. See Perkins, supra note 1, at 525–27 (comparing the redevelopment of both
sites).
154. See id. at 526–27 (analyzing the disparities between the redevelopment of the
Homestead brownfield sites and the South Side brownfield sites).
155. See id. at 510–11, 519 (painting a post-remediation picture of the Homestead
and South Side communities).
156. See id. at 518–19 (praising the remediation results around the South Side
brownfield sites).
157. See id. at 520 (describing the South Side community’s reaction to
remediation).
158. See id. at 527 (finding a higher degree of community empowerment and
satisfaction in South Side than in Homestead).
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increased autonomy.159 Community involvement, alongside the
goals of job creation, affordable green housing, and healthy
sustainable development, can assist low-income communities in
keeping their homes and benefitting from the healthy
redevelopment of brownfield sites.160
Commentators argue that the consideration of EJ goals
during the remediation and redevelopment process is important
to protect the communities most affected by brownfield sites.161
The United States has crafted its framework to hold liable
parties accountable while attempting to encourage remediation
and redevelopment through a system of grants and
complementary state programs.162 The United States has also
prioritized EJ by requiring certain EJ considerations in the grant
process and advocating for sustainable development solutions
through the EPA.163 The US legal framework allows EJ policy to
operate in a way that promotes sustainable development and
community
involvement,
both
of
which
remediate
contamination and ameliorate poverty.164
US brownfield management developed through legislation
and policy. Federal and state remediation programs crafted a
system through which EJ concerns are considered, though not
always to the utmost degree. A lack of adequate EJ consideration
159. See id. at 520 (explaining the South Side community’s positive reactions postremediation).
160. See supra notes 101–34 and accompanying text (analyzing the positive effects
of sustainable redevelopment of brownfield sites on surrounding communities).
161. See, e.g., Felten, supra note 67, at 680 (recognizing the greater incorporation
of EJ goals in brownfield legislation after the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council Waste Facility Siting Subcommittee reported that “greater community
participation, including empowerment and leadership, was one of the primary ways in
which [b]rownfield redevelopment could better serve the needs of the poor and
minorities who are most affected by the programs” (emphasis added)); Andrea RuizEsquide, Comment, The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act: An Environmental Justice
Perspective, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1007, 1024–25 (2004) (explaining the potential problems
that could befall low-income and minority communities around brownfield sites and
recounting the general call of EJ advocates for public participation requirements to
address and eliminate these problems).
162. See supra notes 29–41, 49–62 and accompanying text (explicating the twotiered federal-state brownfield scheme in the United States).
163. See supra notes 44–47, 105–10, 120 and accompanying text (describing US
efforts at incorporating EJ concerns into environmental laws and regulations).
164. See supra notes 102–61 and accompanying text (illustrating how sustainable
development and community involvement satisfy EJ goals and can be encouraged
through legislation, regulation, and policy).
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has negative effects on the minority and low-income populations
disproportionately surrounding brownfield sites. Sustainable
redevelopment and community involvement, however, are two
mechanisms that can meet the dual goals of brownfield
remediation and poverty alleviation. Although Brazil is a country
with a skeleton of brownfield law, certain changes and
modifications to the US system would allow Brazil to flesh out its
current bare minimum standards to provide greater protection
to the poor and to the environment.
II. BRAZILIAN BROWNFIELD REVITALIZATION EFFORTS AND
THE POOR
Site contamination and subsequent management is an issue
of increasing concern in South American countries.165 Although
Brazil is one of the most advanced South American countries
regarding brownfield remediation and redevelopment, smaller
countries on the continent have yet to institute any meaningful
legal framework to deal with this problem.166 Despite Brazil's
headway in comparison to its regional neighbors, Brazil’s
brownfield laws are still underdeveloped.167
This Part discusses the current brownfield framework in
Brazil and demonstrates its systemic legal, social, and
environmental failures. Part II.A. examines the brownfield legal
framework in contemporary Brazil on a national, state, and local
level. Part II.B. explores the connection between poverty and
brownfield sites in Brazil and the consequences of the
perpetuation of contaminated sites.
165. See U.N. Envtl. Programme, Regionally Based Assessment of Persistent Toxic
Substances, ¶ 2.6.11, GE.03-01710 (July 2003) (“The [Eastern and Western South
American] Region has very few officially recognized contaminated sites, mostly in
heavily populated industrial areas, i.e. [the City of] Sao [sic] Paulo (Brazil) . . . .
However, official numbers grossly underestimate the real situation due to illegal or
non-reported contaminated sites throughout the Region. Most of these sites are more
than twenty years old and there is a risk of emission if affordable cleaning technologies
are not available.”).
166. See ANDREAS MARKER, CONTAMINATED SITE MANAGEMENT AND BROWNFIELD
REDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 2, 5 (2007) (explaining that his study focused on
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay, where brownfield sites are already part
of the political discussion, because there is no substantial data from other Latin
American countries).
167. See id. at 10 (stating that “specific legislation on the contaminated site issue
does not yet exist in Brazil”).
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A. Brownfield Revitalization Framework in Brazil
There is no federal legislation or national policy in Brazil
governing contaminated site management.168 There are
correspondingly no legal definitions of relevant terminology,
such as “contaminated site” and “remediated site.”169 The
Brazilian Constitution does, however, recognize the authority of
the federal, state, and local governments to legislate on issues of
environmental liability.170 It also grants power to local
governments to establish urban land use controls.171 Although
states have taken up this mandate through State Environmental
Agencies, the only state that has made any progress through
legislation or policy is the São Paulo State Agency.172 Locally,
there has been some municipal regulation, but the City of São
Paulo remains the only municipality with the strong semblance
of a brownfield policy.173

168. See id. at 13 (noting that although Brazil has submitted some laws on soil
protection and brownfield remediation, the country is still addressing these issues
through pollution control laws from the 1970s); see also Ana Luiza Silva Spínola et al.,
Contaminated Sites and Brownfield Management: State of Art in Brazil and in Germany, 21
MGMT. ENVTL. QUALITY: AN INT’L J. 299, 301 (2010) (discussing the absence of any
federal public policy in Brazil on contaminated sites and brownfield management).
169. See Spínola et al., supra note 168, at 301 (proposing aspects of future
brownfield legislation, including the “legal definition of specific terminology”).
170. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 24 (Braz.) (granting
power to the Union, the States, and the Federal Districts to legislate on environmental
issues).
171. Id. art. 30 (establishing the power of municipalities to institute planning and
land use controls, specifically in urban areas); see Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de
1981, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.9.1981 (Braz.) available at
http://www2.camara.gov.br/legin/indef/lei/1980-1987/lei-6938-31-agosto-1981366135-norma-pl.html (outlining Brazil’s National Environmental Policy, which aims at
the preservation and restoration of the environment and creates a National
Environment System that integrates federal, state, and local institutions to achieve the
legislation’s goals).
172. See MARKER, supra note 166, at 10–11 (noting the singularity of the State of
São Paulo’s contaminated land policy); see, e.g., Áreas Contaminadas, CETESB,
http://www.cetesb.sp.gov.br/areas-contaminadas/ (follow “O que são Áreas
Contaminadas”) (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (explaining the State of São Paulo’s
contaminated land management policy and referencing Brazil’s National
Environmental Policy).
173. See Spínola et al., supra note 168, at 302 (stating that the City of São Paulo is
the exception to the overall lack of municipal control of brownfield sites); cf. MARKER,
supra note 166, at 11, 15, 21–22 (citing the City of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Porto
Alegre as effectively involved municipalities in brownfield site management but failing
to mention any legislation instituted by either Rio de Janeiro or Porto Alegre).
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The Federal Ministry of the Environment is Brazil’s federal
environmental management agency, the mission of which is,
inter alia, to protect and restore the environment and to include
“sustainable development in public policies, in a participative,
democratic, and transversal way, at all levels and instances of
government and society.”174 The Federal Ministry of the
Environment is preparing a resolution on the establishment of
criteria, guide values, and institutional processes for
contaminated site management.175 It has also constructed an
inventory of priority-contaminated sites in Brazil, finding that
there are approximately 700 sites that are hazardous to the
population.176
Comparatively, the São Paulo State Agency has developed a
list of sites for remediation numbering around 2500.177 Despite
almost complete delegation of contaminated site control from
the federal government to the states, the State of São Paulo is
the only state with established regulation for cleanup and
remediation of brownfield sites.178 Additionally, some argue that
174. El Ministério, MINISTÉRIO DE MEIO AMBIENTE, http://www.mma.gov.br/sitio/
en/index.php?ido=conteudo.monta&idEstrutura=206 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011)
(presenting a general overview of the Federal Ministry of the Environment). At a
glance, this mission statement seems like a general statement of quasi-EJ principles,
without the inclusion of a specific prohibition on discrimination and without explicit EJ
recognition. The Federal Ministry of the Environment is responsible for coordinating
and implementing the national environmental policy guidelines established by the
National Environment Council, which advises the federal government on rules and
standards. See Lei No. 6.938 (explaining the federal delegation of authority).
175. See MARKER, supra note 166, at 13–14 (describing efforts at contaminated site
management in Brazil). Information on the Federal Ministry of the Environment’s
efforts at crafting a policy for contaminated site management came from a 2007 study.
Based on a more recent study, the resolution is either not yet complete or is complete
but has a negligible effect. See generally Spínola et al., supra note 168 (failing to mention
the Federal Ministry of the Environment’s resolution).
176. See MARKER, supra note 166, at 14 (pointing out the Federal Ministry of the
Environment’s attempts to assess contaminated sites).
177. See Spínola et al., supra note 168, at 302 (stating that as of 2009, the State of
São Paulo confirmed the existence of 2514 contaminated sites within its borders); see
also MARKER, supra note 166, at 14 (noting that as of 2007, almost 2000 sites in the State
of São Paulo had been registered, investigated, and partly remediated).
178. See MARKER, supra note 166, at 10–11 (calling the State of São Paulo a
“stakeholder of high relevance in the issue” and denoting industrialized states like
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Rio Grande do Sul as “potential
stakeholders”); see, e.g., Áreas Contaminadas, CETESB, http://www.cetesb.sp.gov.br/
areas-contaminadas/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (providing access to information about
contaminated areas and the permitting process; displaying an inventory of
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these steps are not sufficient for effective remediation and
redevelopment.179
At the municipal level, there are neither local instruments
nor local actions to clean up contaminated sites.180 The City of
São Paulo, however, is an exception and has made important
strides towards sustainable brownfield revitalization, passing
specific laws to develop and revitalize degenerated urban
areas.181 The first of these laws established a “master plan,”
laying the foundation for an urban land use policy that not only
recognizes the social, economic, and environmental justice
aspects of brownfield redevelopment but establishes the goals of
improved hazardous waste management and the redevelopment
of contaminated lands.182 Along with the “master plan,” the City
of São Paulo crafted its brownfield policy by creating specific
guidelines for contaminated land management.183 Legislation
providing a foundation for revitalization soon followed,
establishing procedure for building on contaminated sites and
requiring research and risk assessment of such sites or of any
suspected contaminated sites.184
contaminated areas in the State of São Paulo; explaining how to manage a
contaminated area; and offering risk assessment guides); see also Spínola et al., supra
note 168, at 301 (describing the State of São Paulo’s policies).
179. See Spínola et al., supra note 168, at 302 (urging municipalities to accept and
fulfill their responsibilities despite state agency action).
180. See id. (noting that at the municipal level, the absence of both instruments
and actions to enforce intervention on contaminated sites is widespread); see also
MARKER, supra note 166, at 15 (recognizing the City of São Paulo’s developing legal
structure concerning contaminated land, building construction permits, and
reutilization of potentially contaminated sites and the city’s attempts to streamline the
construction licensing process).
181. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (establishing the City of São
Paulo’s legislative efforts towards a consistent brownfield policy).
182. Lei No. 13.430, de 13 de Setembro de 2002, LEI ORDINÁRIA DE SÃO PAULO de
14.9.2002 (Braz.), available at http://sempla.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/pde/LEI_1343013.09.02.pdf (promulgating a strategic urban development policy, including
regulations on environmental zoning that consider social justice issues and
demonstrate a commitment to land use policies that include public participation).
183. Decreto No. 42.319, de 21 de Agosto de 2002, LEI ORDINÁRIA DE SÃO PAULO
de 21.8.2002 (Braz.), available at http://www.radarmunicipal.com.br/legislacao/
decreto-42319 (follow link for “Diário Oficial do Município de São Paulo, 22/08/2002,
p. 1”) (enumerating specific guidelines and procedures for managing contaminated
land in the City of São Paulo, including a requirement for publicizing any potential
health risks and a public participation requirement).
184. Lei No. 13.564, de 24 de Abril de 2003, LEI ORDINÁRIA DE SÃO PAULO, art. 1,
de 25.4.2003 (Braz.), available at http://www.radarmunicipal.com.br/legislacao/lei-
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The City of São Paulo’s legislative strides are the beginnings
of a local policy for contaminated land management that other
localities could emulate.185 Municipalities are important actors
in site remediation and redevelopment because they control
urban land use and occupation and are the governmental actors
who can constrain the use of contaminated properties.186 In a
system devoid of concrete federal or state policy, municipalities
are well-equipped to establish policies on regulation and
licensing of site reutilization, liability issues, and funding.187
B. Poverty and Brownfield Sites in Brazil
As in the United States, there is a connection between
contaminated sites and the poor in Brazil.188 In Brazil, twentytwo percent of people live below the poverty line.189 Eighty-six
percent of the total population lives in urban areas, which have
the greatest disparities in income distribution of any urban areas
in the world.190 Without any effective, comprehensive legislation,
13564 (follow link for “Diário Oficial do Município de São Paulo, 25/04/2003, p. 1”)
(providing for construction on land that is contaminated or suspected of
contamination); Lei No. 13.885, de 25 de Agosto de 2004, LEI ORDINÁRIA DE SÃO
PAULO, art. 201, de 6.10.2004 (Braz.), available at http://www.leispaulistanas.com.br/
sites/default/files/PlanoRegionalEstrategico/LEI%2013885.PDF
(establishing
standards for researching and assessing potential land contamination and health
effects).
185. See MARKER, supra note 166, at 27 (suggesting that although the City of São
Paulo’s efforts at managing contaminated lands are fairly new, other South American
municipal governments could learn from their experiences).
186. See Spínola et al., supra note 168, at 302 (arguing that municipalities play an
important role in site management “because it is the public entity that controls urban
land use and occupation by issuing authorizations and having to also create
mechanisms that legally restrain the use of a contaminated property”); see also MARKER,
supra note 166, at 27 (espousing the importance of local government involvement in
contaminated site management, especially because the American and European
experiences have shown that brownfield redevelopment is generally in the competence
of municipalities).
187. See MARKER, supra note 166, at 15, 27 (explaining how local government
involvement can directly influence brownfield redevelopment efforts).
188. See id. at 17–18 (describing the connection between brownfield sites and
poverty in South America).
189. See Brazil at a Glance, WORLD BANK, 1 (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/bra_aag.pdf (presenting an overview of socioeconomic conditions in Brazil).
190. See id. (presenting an overview of socio-economic conditions in Brazil); U.N.HABITAT, STATE OF THE WORLD’S CITIES 2008/2009: HARMONIOUS CITIES 70 (2008),
available at http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2562
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and absent any policy regarding brownfield cleanup,
contaminated sites are reused without any investigation into
their environmental histories.191 Housing complexes and urban
shanty towns develop on contaminated lands, endangering the
health and economic well-being of poor inhabitants.192 Most of
the time, the impoverished populations are not aware of the
risks to which they are exposed by living on or around a
brownfield.193 This is due to the lack of information on the site
in general, the unavailability of public information if it does
exist, and the inability of the poor to access such information.194
An additional problem surfaces when informal dwellers, or
squatters, move onto contaminated properties.195 Once an
informal dweller occupies a contaminated site, it is harder for
local governments to reintegrate the property because the real
owners cannot be identified, cannot be located, or do not care
about the informal development.196 These informal dwellings
are then exposed to high levels of contaminants, of which they
may or may not know.197 Absent legislation allowing
municipalities to expel the dwellers, all hopes of remediating
and redeveloping the site for economic and social benefits are
quashed.198
As described in Part I, US populations around brownfield
sites experience adverse health effects, loss of jobs and
economic development, weak infrastructures, increased crime
(follow the “Download” hyperlink) (explaining the inequalities of income distribution
in Latin American urban areas).
191. See MARKER, supra note 166, at 17 (discussing how old commercial properties
are redeveloped without any investigation into soil quality). But see supra note 184 and
accompanying text (noting that the City of São Paulo passed legislation requiring
investigation into the environmental history of suspected contaminated sites).
192. See MARKER, supra note 166, at 17–18 (describing the negative effects of
contaminated sites on the poor and illustrating the particular problems experienced by
the poor in Brazil who live atop brownfield sites).
193. Id. at 18.
194. See id. (explicating how the poor unknowingly expose themselves to the
negative effects of brownfield sites because of the lack of comprehensive site inventory,
management, and control in Brazil).
195. See id. (explaining how squatters impede efforts of local governments to
manage or control contaminated sites).
196. See id. (highlighting the difficulties faced by local governments when
attempting to encourage remediation or execute cleanup themselves).
197. See id. (explicating the adverse effects of contaminated sites on the poor).
198. See id. (explaining how the lack of any comprehensive contaminated site
management legislation adversely affects both the poor and the environment).
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rates, and general neighborhood degradation.199 A nonexistent
federal policy and fragmented state and local efforts cannot
shield the environment from harmful contaminants, cannot
adequately protect the poor, and can only harm larger society.200
Although Brazil is advanced in contaminated site
management compared to most of its South American
neighbors, it has yet to institute any national, state, or local
brownfield policy. The State of São Paulo and the City of São
Paulo have begun developing site management law and policy,
but they have yet to be joined by other states or municipalities.
This lack of control on the national level exacerbates poverty
around brownfield sites and increases the difficulty of site
management.
III. APPLICATION OF US BROWNFIELD FRAMEWORK TO
BRAZIL AND OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Based on the experience of the United States in
remediating and redeveloping brownfield sites, Brazil should
follow the US approach in constructing a legislative scheme and
subsequent policy on brownfield cleanups. The US system,
however, is not without its flaws. Part III posits that, with some
modifications, the US framework is a positive example for
Brazil’s brownfield laws. Part III then addresses some possible
problems that Brazil might face during implementation of a
modified US brownfield scheme.
Most importantly, Brazil should institute a unified system,
codified by federal legislation, that provides a legal framework
and regulatory guidance. This framework should establish clear
cleanup goals, create practices and standards for remediation,
and impose certain liabilities with corresponding incentives to
offset risks and encourage development. Brazilian state and local
systems should complement these federal efforts. The integrated
federal-state-local framework, however, should focus on EJ to a
greater degree than in the United States to protect surrounding

199. See supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text (describing the negative
impacts that brownfield sites can have on surrounding communities).
200. See supra notes 188–98 (showing the effects of unremediated brownfield sites
on the surrounding communities).
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vulnerable communities from further harm and to fully
revitalize the blighted area.
First, Brazilian federal legislation should define important
terms so that all stakeholders are fully informed and that all
states and localities are operating on the same understanding.
Clear terminology facilitates clear cleanup goals. In the United
States, CERCLA and the Revitalization Act provide extensive
definitions of all necessary terms to prevent confusion.201
Definitions provide crucial terminology, uniformity, and clarity,
all of which are essential for an efficient brownfield program.
Brazilian federal legislation should also include a statutory
definition of EJ, which would incorporate EJ into the legal
framework and establish it as an important component of
brownfield law.
One crucial note for Brazil is the importance of federal and
state environmental agencies. An overarching federal framework
complemented by state and local systems requires administrative
agencies to manage and regulate brownfield policies. In the
United States, the EPA works to coordinate federal
environmental efforts and to facilitate collaboration between the
federal and state governments.202 Although Brazil benefits from
the Federal Ministry of the Environment, and although there
are environmental departments in certain Brazilian states, these
agencies should be established in every state.203 The Federal
Ministry of the Environment has already shown a concern for
sustainable development and public participation in
environmental policies.204 This should be expanded to
incorporate the full definition of EJ.205 All Brazilian federal and
state environmental administrative agencies should include a
full EJ definition in their brownfield policies and should

201. See supra note 5 (noting that the US federal legislation defines all relevant
terminology).
202. See supra notes 24, 39–42, 49–70 and accompanying text (discussing the
interplay between federal and state cleanup programs in the United States).
203. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text (noting the existence of
Brazil’s federal environmental agencies as well as the scarcity of state environmental
authorities).
204. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text (showing the Federal Ministry
of the Environment’s recognition of important EJ considerations).
205. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (exploring the various nuanced
definitions of EJ).
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establish EJ agency subdivisions, such as the Office of
Environmental Justice in the EPA.206 Brazilian agencies should
explicitly enumerate the goals of promoting sustainable
development and community involvement to alleviate poverty.207
Brazilian federal legislation should also provide guidance
on remediation standards. Although CERCLA establishes
certain cleanup standards, the statute’s practical result is that
site remedies are analyzed on a case-by-case basis.208 Brazil
should follow this framework but with more detailed guidance.
Brazil should institute a general cleanup procedure that
requires site inquiries and an in-depth assessment of
remediation techniques. This will not only set precedent for
Brazilian state and local government standards but will also set a
baseline for future cleanups. Recognizing that site specificity is a
necessary feature of brownfield site management, Brazil should
work off of the Federal Ministry of the Environment’s current
hazardous waste site inventory list to set minimum cleanup
standards for at least the most dangerous contaminants.209 This
will inject heightened clarity into the standards and avoid
confusion as to remediation efficacy. In time, certain general
cleanup standards could be established for all or almost all of
Brazil’s hazardous contaminants.
Cleanup standards should also take EJ considerations into
account. For example, when Brazilian legislation requires an
assessment of remediation techniques, it should also mandate
that stakeholders address vulnerable populations, such as lowincome and minority individuals, when deciding a proper
remediation plan. Including EJ as a statutory requirement,
instead of as an Executive Order, will increase the chances that
vulnerable populations will be protected during and after

206. See supra note 13 (referencing the EPA Office of Environmental Justice’s
established definition of EJ).
207. See supra Part I.B.3. (promulgating the importance of sustainable
development and community involvement in satisfying EJ goals and effectively
remediating brownfield sites).
208. See supra note 11 (demonstrating CERCLA’s ad hoc, if not vague,
remediation requirements).
209. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (noting that the Brazilian Federal
Ministry of the Environment is constructing a list of the most hazardous sites in Brazil).
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remediation.210 An EJ statutory requirement, coupled with an EJ
statutory definition, will legally codify EJ as a serious concern
and surpass the United States’ efforts at EJ protections.211
An overarching Brazilian federal framework should include
liability for cleanup to incentivize change in current industry
practices and to fund remediation.212 A clear establishment of
liability standards will help dissolve questions about
responsibility, which will not only assuage the fears of non-liable
developers and encourage them to redevelop the site but force
the responsible parties to pay for cleanup. When no private
liability is discoverable, Brazilian states and localities should take
up the helm and remediate abandoned sites.213 Additionally,
Brazil should incorporate safe harbor provisions for new
developers, like the US Revitalization Act’s Bona Fide Purchaser
Program.214 This will encourage development by helping to
dissolve some liability for non-contributors.215
Incentives to redevelop can help to overcome liability
hurdles. This can be done through grant programs and the
encouragement of state and local brownfield management
systems.216 The EPA’s grant programs, although often falling
short, are a step in the right direction toward igniting

210. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (describing Executive Order
12,898 mandating agency consideration of EJ in the United States and noting its
shortcomings).
211. See supra notes 44–47, 63–70, 162–63, and accompanying text (explaining the
importance of EJ considerations in brownfield legislation and policy and showing that
the United States does not completely satisfy these considerations).
212. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA’s farreaching liability scheme, which holds responsible actors accountable for cleanup and
deters developers from contaminating sites).
213. See supra notes 53–61, 186–87 and accompanying text (emphasizing the
importance of state and local involvement in contaminated site management and
remediation).
214. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text (describing the US Bona Fide
Prospective Purchaser (“BFPP”) program, which allows developers to avoid CERCLA
liability if they meet certain standards promulgated by the EPA).
215. See supra note 35–36 and accompanying text (addressing the effect of the
BFPP program, which allows certain developers to avoid legal liability for
contamination).
216. See supra notes 39–70 and accompanying text (explaining the federal support
of state brownfield programs in the United States).
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remediation efforts.217 The EPA provides these grants directly to
US states, as established by the Revitalization Act.218 This
encourages cleanup while bolstering US state and local
systems.219
Brazil’s Federal Ministry of the Environment should
consider EJ goals when it awards funding.220 Like the EPA's grant
mandate, the Federal Ministry of the Environment should be
required to consider the reduction of threats to vulnerable
populations and to assess the needs of low-income
communities.221 Unlike the EPA's grant mandate, these should
be prime considerations, instead of just three out of ten, and
there should be sufficient oversight to ensure the protection of
these goals.222
Another way for Brazil’s grant program to incorporate EJ
goals is to formulate grants that are earmarked specifically for
sustainable development on brownfield sites surrounded by
impoverished communities. These grants could be provided
from government funds or from a general tax on the public.
The tax could also stem from the use of the structure built on a
redeveloped brownfield site; for example, if a wind farm were
built on a brownfield site, a tax on energy provided to system
users could be set aside specifically for other sustainable
development initiatives.
As a regulatory agency, the Brazilian Federal Ministry of the
Environment should take the lead in regulating EJ policies
within the statutory EJ framework. Like the EPA, the Federal
Ministry of the Environment should provide programs to
promote green jobs, urban agriculture, and a variety of
217. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA’s grant
program that funds the cleanup of brownfield sites but which is inadequate to fully
remediate all of the current existing brownfield sites in the United States).
218. See supra text accompanying note 39 (proffering the statutory mandate for
the EPA’s funding program).
219. See supra text accompanying note 49 (noting statutory authority for the grant
as an incentive for states to spearhead redevelopment).
220. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (recounting criteria that the US
Revitalization Act requires the EPA to examine when reviewing grant applications).
221. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (explaining EJ requirements
that the EPA must consider when granting funding).
222. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
inadequacies of US federal brownfield legislation in fully protecting EJ populations,
notably low-income communities).
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These
sustainable
sustainable
development
paths.223
development initiatives should be targeted at low-income
communities around brownfield sites.224 Most importantly,
Brazilian federal, state, and local environmental agencies should
regulate development to include plans for “green” affordable
housing.225 Brazilian state and local governments in particular
should craft sustainable development policies with requirements
for affordable housing in an effort to prevent the development
of impoverished communities around and directly on top of
brownfield sites.226 This could be done by tying construction
permits to requirements that mandate green building tactics
and the construction of affordable housing for any displaced
populations.227 This will further protect the poor and maximize
the positive effects of sustainable development.
Additionally, Brazilian regulations should provide
incentives to redevelop sustainably.228 Tax credits for sustainable
redevelopment might be one type of incentive. It is important,
however, that these tax credits do not become perverse and
incentivize
luxury
developments
over
community
remediation.229 They should be tied to the overall cleanup of the
site, the benefit to the surrounding community, and the degree
to which the builder developed sustainably.230 Particularly, larger
tax credits should be given to developers who build affordable,
223. See supra notes 121–23, 130–34, and accompanying text (emphasizing the
EPA’s efforts to encourage various types of sustainable development).
224. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that the EPA encourages
the sustainable redevelopment of brownfield sites because it can benefit surrounding
communities).
225. See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text (describing community-based
and federally-encouraged efforts to build affordable, sustainable housing as part of
brownfield redevelopment projects).
226. See supra notes 191–98 and accompanying text (explaining how both formal
and informal dwellings are constructed on contaminated sites because there is no
uniform system researching, documenting, or controlling their use).
227. See supra note 121 (noting the positive developments resulting from linking
construction permits and green infrastructure).
228. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the various tax credits
available for renewable energy investment and development).
229. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (citing the New York
brownfield program as an example of when tax credits for redevelopment turn
perverse).
230. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (explaining ways in which the
New York brownfield program could have prevented its tax credits from becoming
perverse).
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green housing on brownfield sites and effectively limit
gentrification.231 This can be coupled with any agency
requirements for providing sustainable, affordable housing
along with redevelopment.232 Although the Brazilian Federal
Ministry of the Environment should promulgate these
regulations and incentives, Brazilian states and localities could
implement similar systems.
Brazilian state and local systems are essential to a fully
operational national brownfield framework.233 They can mimic
and bolster many of the aforementioned federal policies, such as
funneling taxes toward sustainable projects to help the poor,
incentivizing sustainable development, and incorporating EJ
goals into their missions.234 The current fragmentation and
ineffectiveness of these state and local systems, however, should
spur the Brazilian federal government to buttress these
programs before granting them the wide discretion that they
currently hold.235 Although the Brazilian federal government
cannot bolster other programs before fixing its own, it should
take into account Brazilian state and local systems when crafting
its own regulatory scheme. The weakness of current Brazilian
state and local programs should influence the first few years of
brownfield policy after the passage of a national scheme. During
this time, there should be tight federal-state-local cooperation.
As the Brazilian federal program grows and stakeholders have a
better idea of cleanup goals and standards, the Brazilian federal
government can grant states and localities increased autonomy.

231. See supra notes 105–15, 151–52 and accompanying text (describing efforts to
build affordable, sustainable housing and noting the dangers of gentrification).
232. See supra notes 225–27 and accompanying text (providing possible avenues
for a Brazilian brownfield policy to require sustainable redevelopment that benefits
both the poor and the environment).
233. See supra notes 49–55, 170–87, and accompanying text (explicating the
importance of US VCPs and showing that the absence of Brazilian state and local
framework is less than beneficial to the regulation of contaminated sites).
234. See supra notes 201–11, 220–32, and accompanying text (suggesting ways in
which a national Brazilian brownfield policy could revitalize contaminated sites and
protect surrounding communities).
235. See supra notes 177–87 and accompanying text (demonstrating the dispersed
and limited state and local programs to regulate contaminated sites).
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Like in the United States, Brazilian state and local
governments should have public participation requirements.236
These requirements should be more than just public
announcements and public commenting periods.237 There
should be sustained community involvement at every level of
planning.238 Community outreach groups should be formed
locally as part of the developer’s plan to keep the community
fully informed.239 Integrating impoverished communities into
the redevelopment process would allow communities to
adequately protect their interests.240 Forming citizen outreach
groups would permit those who may not have the time or
opportunity to attend meetings to easily access distilled and
comprehensible information. This would enable them to stay
involved without sacrificing valuable time in the labor market.
Information dissemination requirements should be included as
well. This would hopefully limit the development of urban
shanty towns on abandoned brownfield sites.241 Site owners or
Brazilian local governments should bear the responsibility of
preventing these communities from developing in and on top of
danger zones.242
There will be roadblocks on the path to achieving a
successfully integrated brownfield framework that adequately
protects both the poor and the environment in Brazil. For
example, Brazil may have problems with funding. CERCLA has
236. See supra notes 67, 135–59 and accompanying text (explaining that CERCLA
requires some form of public participation requirement and discussing what these
requirements typically entail).
237. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
inadequacies of notice and comment periods alone).
238. See supra notes 138–50 and accompanying text (explicating the importance
of community involvement and providing examples of which types of involvement
better satisfy EJ goals).
239. See, e.g., supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text (highlighting the
importance of community outreach groups through a comparative case study in
Western Pennsylvania).
240. See supra notes 136–38, 151–52 and accompanying text (examining the
importance of community involvement so that populations near brownfield sites can
protect their interests).
241. See supra notes 191–98 and accompanying text (explaining the development
of formal and informal communities on contaminated sites and the government’s
limited control of such developments).
242. See supra notes 191–98 and accompanying text (underscoring the hazards of
unregulated contaminated sites and the difficulties faced by both local governments
and surrounding communities when brownfield sites languish absent legislation).

2011]

BROWNFIELDS AND THE POOR

247

been in force for over thirty years and the United States still
cannot fully fund brownfield cleanups.243 Another problem may
arise in the interplay between Brazilian federal, state, and local
governments. Given the great independence of state and local
governments today, delegation of authority from Brazilian
federal agencies might become entangled in bureaucratic
constraints.244 These obstacles, however, should not halt any
progress toward a comprehensive brownfield revitalization
framework in Brazil.
CONCLUSION
Although the United States has created a statutory
brownfield cleanup framework within which EJ policies operate,
Brazil has the opportunity to incorporate EJ concerns directly
into its statutes and to complement these statutes with EJ
regulations. The United States has provided a good working
model for Brazil to establish brownfield cleanup statutes and to
legally require the adequate consideration of impoverished
communities surrounding brownfield sites. This can be done
through urging sustainable development and public
participation as policy approaches within a legislative framework
that requires EJ considerations at every step of the revitalization
process. By instituting brownfield legislation that addresses EJ
considerations, Brazil can create a brownfield revitalization
scheme that protects both the poor and the environment. This
can also help to entrench Brazil at the forefront of South
American brownfield policy, which may encourage other
countries in the region to formulate similar legislation and
which would increase the protection of the environment and of
society’s most vulnerable populations.

243. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the federal
brownfield program cannot fully fund the cost of remediating present and future
contaminated sites).
244. See supra notes 168–87 and accompanying text (discussing the Brazilian
federal, state, and local roles in environmental control and showing how the lack of
federal policy and the delegation of environmental controls to states and localities has
left state and local governments with wide, albeit unfulfilled, discretion).

